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IT IS TIME FOR A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
THOMAS D. CRANDALLt
In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, with emphasis in its "Truth in Lending"provisions on dis-
closure of credit terms in consumer transactions. Although the
disclosure provisions in the "Truth in Lending"portion of the
Act are intended to preempt inconsistent state law, most con-
sumer credit regulation is still left largely to the states. In most
states, this regulation consists of a variety of statutes covering
discrete areas such as usury, secured transactions and various
creditor practices. Professor Crandall demonstrates that the
complexity and nonunformity inherent in this patchwork of
state statutes makes compliance vexatious for creditors, while
providing little protection for consumers. He then shows how
this problem is exacerbated by the inadequacies and uncertain-
ties ofpresentfederal regulation. To remedy this situation, Pro-
fessor Crandallpresents a detailedproposalfor a comprehensive
federal consumer credit code containing all legislation relating
to the direct regulation of consumer credit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer credit is defined as the lending of money or sale of
goods and services to a natural person for a personal, family or house-
hold purpose in which a finance charge is levied or the loan or sale is
repayable in more than four installments by one who regularly makes
such loans or sales.' It is a multibillion dollar business.2 Consumers
are financing purchases of everything from vacations to health spa
1. There is no one definition of consumer credit. The definition in the text, however, is
utilized in both the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e)-(O, (h)
(1976), and the most recent version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 1.301(3), (12), (15), (18), (30) (1974 version).
The definition in the text is not all inclusive. Both the CCPA and the 1974 UCCC have a
number of types of transactions excluded from their definitions of consumer credit. For example,
most transactions in which the amount financed exceeds $25,000 are excluded. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1603(3) (1976) (real estate transactions included whatever the amount financed); UNIFORM CON-
SUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 1.301(12)(a)(v), (15)(a)(iv). Under the UCCC most real estate transac-
tions are excluded whatever the amount financed. Id. §§ 1.301(12)(b)(ii), (15)(b)(ii).
Leasing arrangements, and not just credit sales of consumer goods and consumer loans, are
also increasingly subject to consumer credit regulation. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667(e)
(1976). On a state by state basis, the transactions subject to special consumer credit regulation
vary considerably. See 2-4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH).
2. Between 1950 and 1971, consumer credit outstanding increased from $21.5 billion to
$137.2 billion. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (1972) fhereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
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memberships, and are borrowing money not only via traditional loans
from banks, finance companies, credit unions, and other lending insti-
tutions, but increasingly by check overdrafts and through the use of
credit cards as well. There is no limit in sight; nor does there seem to
be any serious movement to initiate one.
Consumer credit regulation is primarily a matter of state law. The
maximum rates of finance and other permissible charges, available
methods for calculating charges, methods for rebating unearned
charges, controls on creditor practices in initiating a transaction, and
the creditors' and consumers' remedies are examples of consumer
credit regulation mostly left to the states.' But the federal government
has also been indirectly involved with its regulation for many years.
More recent federal regulation is designed to directly regulate con-
sumer credit transactions.'
There are major problems with the present state-federal system
caused by the needless complexity and nonuniformity of state regula-
tion, the refusal by most states to enact consumer protection provisions.
as an integral part of their consumer credit laws, federal preemption
issues, and the increasing tendency of the federal government to control
harsh credit practices by Federal Trade Commission rule rather than
by statute. This article, after discussing the problems with the existing
regulatory structure, proposes as an alternative to the present system a
comprehensive federal consumer credit code. It concludes by consider-
ing the likely criticisms of such a proposal.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF CONSUMER
CREDIT REGULATION
A. State Regulation
Primary regulation of consumer credit at the state level has not
worked because (1) most states' consumer credit laws are overly com-
plex and offer little guidance to the creditor seeking to comply or the
consumer seeking protection; (2) the lack of uniform state laws unnec-
essarily increases compliance costs and creates difficult choice of law
3. For a collection of state consumer credit laws, see 2-4 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH).
4. See, e.g., National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976) (first passed in 1864); Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976) (first passed in 1800). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
was enacted Nov. 6, 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330) (effective Oct. 1979).
5. The most notable recent federal statute is the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976).
1979]
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problems for the interstate creditor, and (3) the states have not gener-
ally kept pace with the need for additional consumer protections.
1. Complexity
Most states have a "scattered" approach to consumer credit: the
applicable set of statutes for any particular consumer credit transaction
depends primarily on what type of credit grantor is extending the
credit. This unsatisfactory approach to consumer credit regulation
stems from the checkered development of consumer credit granting.
Before the turn of the century there was a significant amount of
lending for consumer credit purposes, but little from authorized credit
institutions. Traditional credit institutions had other, more lucrative
sources for investment, and legal usury rates were considered too low to
make consumer credit lending attractive. As a consequence, consumers
were often forced to borrow from "loan sharks" who grossly violated
the states' usury statutes. After studying this problem, the Russell Sage
Foundation proposed a Uniform Small Loan Law for adoption by the
states. The proposal authorized a new class of lenders, "small loan"
companies, who were limited to lending amounts of $300 or less at a
higher rate of interest than that prescribed by the general usury rates.
It was assumed these small loan companies would provide a small loan
market that would serve as an alternative to borrowing from the loan
sharks.6
Most states adopted small loan statutes because of the Founda-
tion's proposal, and such statutes are generally considered the first at-
tempt at consumer credit regulation by the states. 7 Small loan statutes
primarily provided a licensing structure for small loan companies, limi-
tations of the amount such companies could lend, and maximum rates
of finance charges higher than those allowed in the general usury stat-
utes.' Of lesser effect were some minimal consumer protections that
were generally included.' Over the years, although there have been a
few added consumer protections, further benefits have also been be-
stowed on small loan companies. For example, restrictions on the
amount that small loan companies can loan at the authorized high rates
6. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 2 (1965).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 16.
9. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 31.08.150 (Supp. 1978) (prohibits certain deceptive
advertising practices).
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have been significantly liberalized.10 Finance companies, as the small
loan companies are now more commonly known, still primarily engage
in consumer credit transactions under these small loan laws in states
with a scattered approach to consumer credit regulation.
Despite the presence of finance companies, most of the dollar vol-
ume of consumer credit lending today is by depositary institutions-
those institutions allowed to accept deposits by their customers."
These depositary institutions-banks, credit unions, and savings and
loan associations-are regulated solely by the states if they are state
chartered. Federally chartered banks, credit unions, and savings and
loan associations are also regulated by federal statutes and regulations.
Problems created because of the interrelationship of the federal and
state regulatory schemes will be discussed later.' 2
The major purpose of state regulation of consumer lending by de-
positary institutions, like federal regulation of those institutions, is the
protection of depositors. 3 Every state has general banking, credit
union, and savings and loan laws with which lenders of each type must
comply, whether engaging in consumer or nonconsumer lending. 14 In
addition, primarily to provide an exemption from the general usury
rates that would otherwise be applicable, most states with a scattered
approach also have other statutes specifically designed to regulate con-
sumer lending by depositary institutions.
Morris Plan banks were the first type of bank engaged in consumer
lending. They were first organized in 1910 and later became known as
"industrial banks." The major purpose of industrial banks was to enter
the consumer lending market, which at the time was not financially
interesting to commercial banks because of low usury rate limitations.
General usury rate limitations were circumvented by industrial banks
via a method of calculating a finance charge called "discounting" and
by requiring each borrower to become a "depositor." Loans with these
features were called "industrial loans." Over a period of years such
loans were authorized in nearly half the states. In some states, lenders
other than industrial banks, including traditional commercial banks,
are allowed to grant industrial loans. The primary substantive provi-
sions of industrial loan laws, in addition to authorizing industrial
10. See, e.g., id. § 31.08.160(l). The maximum amount that may now be loaned in Washing-
ton by a small loan company is $2,500. Id.
11. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
12. Part II.B. infra.
13. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.
14. B. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 45-47.
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banks, are those that carve out a statutorily authorized exception to the
general usury rates. 15 Consumer protection is minimal in industrial
loan laws; even the mild consumer protections found in the small loan
acts are not generally evident. 16
Commercial banks became heavily involved in consumer lending
after the Depression. To avoid the general usury statutes, most states
passed "installment loan laws," which authorized commercial banks to
charge a higher rate of interest than permitted by the general usury
statutes. Several states expanded their installment loan laws to author-
ize installment loans by industrial as well as commercial banks.' 7
Again, consumer protection is minimal. In states without special in-
stallment loan laws, banks make consumer loans solely under the gen-
eral banking and usury laws or industrial loan laws.'
In addition to industrial loan, installment loan, general banking,
banking, and usury laws, some states have specific statutes regulating,
for example, loans pursuant to bank-issued credit cards' 9 or check-
credit plans.2" Once again, the primary function of such statutes is to
allow a higher rate of finance charge than would otherwise be allowed
by the general usury statute.2'
Credit unions engage heavily in consumer lending.22 The primary
focus of state laws regulating consumer loans by credit unions is also to
establish a maximum rate of finance charge higher than the general
usury rate. 3 In some states, however, there are no special consumer
credit laws applicable to credit unions and the credit union is, there-
fore, subject only to the general usury statute,2 4 or, in some states, to an
installment loan law.
Savings and loan associations are generally permitted to engage in
consumer loans secured by members' shares in, or savings accounts
with, the associations. Most are also authorized to make unsecured
loans for the purpose of repair and improvement to residential real
15. Id. at 52-53.
16. See id. at 59.
17. Id. at 66.
18. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
19. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1107.27 (1968).
20. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-59.6 to .8 (West Supp. 1978).
21. See, e.g., id. §§ 17:9A-59.7, .8.
22. In 1970, credit unions had $12.5 billion of consumer credit outstanding which was 12.4%
of all such credit outstanding. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
23. See B. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 47.
24. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
25. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.01(l) (Vernon 1971).
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property. Unlike laws regulating loans by other depositary institutions,
consumer lending laws for savings and loans are primarily limited to
merely an authorization of the loan.26 The maximum rate of finance
charge for a savings and loan association in a scattered approach state
is usually that under the general usury statute.27 In a few states, how-
ever, savings and loans are authorized to lend under installment loan
laws.28
Regulation of retail sellers who sell goods pursuant to a consumer
credit transaction has a more recent history than the regulation of lend-
ers. Until relatively recently, all aspects of retail consumer credit sales
were unregulated. Because of the long accepted "time-price" doctrine,
even the charge for credit was generally assumed to be excluded from
the coverage of the states' general usury statutes.29 In 1935,.Indiana
passed the first "retail installment sales act," 30 and now most states
have their own version. Initially, consumer protection consisted almost
exclusively of disclosure requirements on the theory that informed con-
sumers could not be hurt.31 Although disclosure remains the primary
emphasis, most modem retail installment sales acts also prohibit cer-
tain abusive practices32 and limit the maximum rates of finance
charge.33
Some states have "all goods" retail installment acts that cover all
credit sales of consumer goods. 34 Other states have one act for all con-
sumer credit sales of goods other than motor vehicles and another for
the credit sale of motor vehicles, and their provisions may vary sub-
stantially.35
In a scattered approach state, then, one might find consumer credit
26. B. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 60-61.
27. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
28. See, e.g., TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.01(1) (Vernon 1971).
29. Historically, retailers who sold goods on credit were considered not subject to usury limi-
tations if the sale was structured as a "time-price sale." That is, the retailer could charge a higher
"time-price" if the customer paid over a period of time than that normally charged if the customer
paid a "cash price" at the time of sale. The difference between the normal cash price and the time-
price, the "time-price differential," was generally not considered an interest or finance charge and,
therefore, not controlled by usury statutes. For an analysis of the time-price doctrine, see State v.
J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
30. B. CURRAN, supra note 6, at 2 & n.7.
31. See D. ROTHCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION: TEXT AND MATERIALS
§ 19.03 at 692 (2d ed. 1977).
32. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1807.3 (West 1973) (limits the use of "balloon payments,"
payments that are substantially larger than other periodic payments).
33. See, e.g., id. § 1805.1.
34. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 476-1 to -38 (1976).
35. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-281 to -295, -6001 to -6006 (Supp. 1978).
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regulation in the form of small loan laws, general usury laws, industrial
loan laws, installment loan laws, credit card laws, laws affecting only
check-credit plans, special provisions for credit unions, and/or one or
more retail installment sales acts (depending upon the state and the
type of goods-motor vehicle or not). Other consumer credit statutes
such as those affecting consumer credit insurance,36 insurance premium
financing,37 or even those solely affecting home improvements38 might
also be found. The complexity resulting from the scattered approach
can best be illustrated by example. Below are four hypothetical con-
sumer credit transactions applying relevant Washington law, an exam-
ple of state regulation by the scattered approach.
a. Credit Sale Financed by the Seller
Assume Mike Little decides to purchase for his personal use a $300
television set from Sally's Appliances. Further assume that Mike wants
to have the transaction financed. Sally's, a new organization, decides
that if they are going to compete they should offer credit and agrees to
finance the transaction. The newly hired credit manager is given the
task of setting up the transaction, and he contacts the attorney for
Sally's for advice. The attorney remembers from law school39 that
Washington has a version of a retail installment sales act known as the
Credit Disclosure Act. He finds it at Chapter 63.14 in the Washington
Revised Code Annotated under the heading "Retail Installment Sales
of Goods and Services."' 40 It is applicable to Sally's transaction with
Mike. Sally's attorney first searches for the maximum rate of finance
charge available to Sally's for the transaction and finds, at section
63.14.130, a section entitled "Retail installment contracts and retail
charge agreements-Service charge, composition, other fees and
charges prohibited-Maximums." 41 From the definition of "service
charge,"'42 Sally's attorney determines that the term is synonymous with
36. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 509.1(3) (West Supp. 1978).
37. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.11501-.11514 (Callaghan 1974 & Supp. 1978).
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-21.4 (1975).
39. Students get little exposure in most law schools to the study of consumer credit law de-
spite its complexity. To the extent it is a part of the curriculum, consumer credit law is generally
part of a "consumer protection" course in which the instructor must also cover a variety of non-
credit law such as warranty and state and federal unfair and deceptive trade practice laws.
40. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 63.14 (1966 & Supp. 1978).
41. Id. § 63.14.130 (Supp. 1978).
42. "the amount which is paid or payable for the privilege of purchasing goods or services to
be paid for by the buyer in installments over a period of time." Id. § 63.14.010.
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the "finance charge"4 3 required to be disclosed under the federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act.'
As the title of section 63.14.130 suggests, in order to determine the
applicable maximum rate the attorney must first determine whether the
seller wants to utilize a "retail installment contract" or a "retail charge
agreement." He finds from a comparison of the definitions of those
terms that a "retail installment contract" contemplates a one-shot
transaction,45 whereas a "retail charge agreement" contemplates a re-
volving plan-more than one purchase by Mike. 6 After confirming it
with Sally's, the attorney decides to utilize a "retail installment con-
tract" that provides for thirty-six equal installments with a finance
charge figured at the maximum applicable rate of one percent per
month on the unpaid balance or twelve percent per annum. 47 As per-
mitted by the Credit Disclosure Act, the contract also provides for a
minimum finance charge of twenty-five dollars.48 If Mike decides to
pay off the obligation earlier than planned, this ensures that Sally's will
receive at least a twenty-five dollar finance charge, whatever the maxi-
mum rate yields. If Sally's had opted for a "retail charge agreement,"
the maximum rate of finance charge would also be one percent per
month.49 The minimum finance charge for such agreements, however,
is on a per month basis equaling one dollar per month, whatever the
maximum rate yields.5
The attorney wants to provide in the contract for a penalty charge
if Mike is late in his payment and finds a provision for delinquency
charges. He finds, however, that for both "retail installment contracts"
and "retail charge agreements," there is no specified maximum delin-
quency charge, but only a provision for a "reasonable" delinquency
charge.' Nor can the attorney find a provision stating when a payment
may be considered delinquent. Finding no relevant case law, the attor-
ney provides in the contract for a delinquency charge of ten dollars or
ten percent of the installment past due, whichever is less, whenever
Mike is three days late. 2 The attorney also provides for a security
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976).
45. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.14.010(6) (Supp. 1978).
46. Id. § 63.14.010(7).
47. Id. § 63.14.130(1)(a).
48. Id. § 63.14.080.
49. Id. § 63.14.130(2).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 63.14.090 (1966).
52. This is a higher rate and a shorter time period for determining when the rate may be
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interest in the television.
Mike defaults on his obligation and Sally's credit manager wants
to repossess the television. Finding no prohibition of repossession
under the Credit Disclosure Act, Sally's attorney merely advises Sally's
credit manager not to trespass in repossessing the television because of
the relevant provision against a "breach of the peace" under Washing-
ton's Uniform Commercial Code.53
The credit manager gets Mike's permission to repossess the televi-
sion, repossesses the television, and resells it for an amount less than
the amount still owed. The credit manager then asks the attorney to
sue for a deficiency judgment.54 The attorney finds no prohibition
against a deficiency judgment in the Credit Disclosure Act but does
find this provision in Washington's version of section 9-501(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case of a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods taken or re-
tained by the seller of such collateral to secure all or part of its price,
the debtor shall not be liable for any deficiency after the secured
party has disposed of such collateral ... in satisfaction of the debt.55
The attorney therefore advises Sally's credit manager that Sally's is not
entitled to a deficiency. Sally's attorney makes a mental note that the
next time he will advise Sally's to bring a simple action for breach of
contract. Upon entry of a judgment, Sally's may have execution levied
on the collateral and still have a remaining judgment for any deficiency
left after the sheriffs sale of the collateral-the equivalent of reposses-
sing collateral and suing for a deficiency.56
b. Credit Sale Pursuant to a Retail Installment Contract Subsequently
Assigned to a Finance Company
Assume that shortly after Mike's transaction, Sally's reconsiders
charged than allowed in some states for retail installment sales. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1803.6
(West 1973). But with no statutory limitation in Washington other than "reasonable," the delin-
quency charges levied by merchants in Washington are not likely to be challenged. There are no
reported cases in which such a challenge has been raised.
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-503 (1966). The prohibition against a "breach of the
peace" is the only UCC limitation concerning the process of self-help repossession.
54. Id. Section 62A.9-504 provides that a secured creditor is entitled, in a separate action, to
any deficiency that remains after deducting from the proceeds of the resale, the costs of reposses-
sion, holding the collateral, preparing it for resale, permissible attorneys' fees and legal expenses,
plus the remaining indebtedness.
55. Id. § 62A.9-501(l).
56. See Lew v. Goodfellow Chrysler-Plymouth, 6 Wash. App. 226, 231-32, 492 P.2d 258, 262
(1971) (dictum).
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and decides they want out of the financing business. 7 Sally's assigns
Mike's contract to Happy Finance Company.
It is generally assumed in Washington that assignees of a retail
installment contract, whether finance companies or other legal entities
organized as lenders, are subject to the terms of the Credit Disclosure
Act and to the terms of the retail installment contract prepared by the
seller and assigned. Also, although the above-quoted section 62A.9-
501(1)58 prohibits only the "seller" from obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment, the limitation is assumed to be applicable to a lender who takes
by assignment. 9
But consider the Washington Supreme Court case of National
Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen.6" The National Bank of Commerce
was the assignee of a retail installment sales contract prepared by the
seller of goods. Under Washington law, banks engaged in direct lend-
ing, whether or not for a consumer purpose, are subject to the general
usury rate.6' At the time the transaction at issue was consummated,
sellers in Washington were not subject to any maximum rate of finance
charge. The "time-price" exception was accepted in Washington, and
sellers were presumed to be able to charge whatever the traffic would
bear as a "time-price differential." 62 This, the bank argued, was the
rate law applicable to it as a mere assignee of the seller, rather than the
general usury rate law.63 Not true, the court decided. When a lender
57. In increasing numbers, small retailers are getting out of the direct credit business. Most
retailers in discussing this trend with the author have stated that they no longer wanted to extend
credit directly because they no longer knew how to comply with both state and federal laws and
because the costs of achieving and retaining compliance-primarily ever-increasing attorneys'
fees-were prohibitive. Instead, these retailers now utilize bank charge card plans, assign all con-
tracts or refer all customers to a finance company or bank that has agreed to finance the retailers'
customers.
58. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
59. The author is aware of no cases in which the assignee-lender claimed the inapplicability
of either the Credit Disclosure Act or § 62A.9-501. In a personal conversation in December 1977
with an attorney representing a large bank that finances consumer credit sales by taking assign-
ment of credit sale contracts, the author was told that the assumption of the applicability of
§ 62A.9-501(I) has never been questioned by lender-assignees because of the (unrecorded) legisla-
tive history of the provision. During debate on the UCC, he stated, a number of legislators were
concerned that the adoption of article 9 as originally drafted would, for the first time in Washing-
ton, allow deficiency judgments in a transaction pursuant to a conditional sales contract. Section
9-501 of the original UCC was, therefore, amended to prohibit deficiency judgments in all transac-
tions that prior to the UCC's adoption would be considered conditional sales. The use of the word
"seller" in amended § 9-501, he continued, has, therefore, always been thought to include the
assignee of a conditional sales contract (retail installment contracts).
60. 80 Wash. 2d 406, 495 P.2d 332 (1972).
61. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
62. 80 Wash. 2d at 410-11, 495 P.2d at 335-36.
63. Id. at 408, 495 P.2d at 335.
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such as the National Bank of Commerce regularly accepted the assign-
ment of retail installment contracts from the seller, a loan was involved
and not a sale. Therefore, the court held that National Bank, whether
or not an assignee, was limited to the general usury rate applicable to
banks.'
The general usury rate for consumer loans by banks in Washing-
ton is by statute now equivalent to the maximum rate of service charge
for sellers entering into consumer credit sales.65 But that is not true for
direct loans by small loan companies like Happy Finance.66 Based on
National Bank, could Happy Finance successfully argue that it should
be subject to the small loan rate of up to thirty percent per year,67
rather than Sally's twelve percent rate, and that it should not be subject
to the limitation on deficiency judgments because it is truly a "lender"
and not a "seller" as specified in the previously quoted Washington
version of section 9-501(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code?68 Who
knows? There is a strong public policy argument to the contrary-the
argument of Happy Finance, if accepted, would allow circumvention of
Washington's limitation on the maximum rate for credit sales. There
is, however, no statutory guidance on the issue. There are two provi-
sions in the Credit Disclosure Act that prohibit the loss of "claims and
defenses" available to the buyer because of the use of a waiver of de-
fenses with respect to an assignee clause,69 and there is a Federal Trade
Commission rule to the same effect.70 Such regulation, however, is
designed to preserve the consumer's self-enforcement right of stopping
payment in installment transactions.7' It is not designed to establish
the substantive law on rates of finance charge or the availability of defi-
ciency judgments to the credit grantor.72
64. Id. at 415, 495 P.2d at 339.
65. For banks, the maximum rate is 12%, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978), and
for retailers, 12%, id § 63.14.130 (Supp. 1978).
66. Id. § 31.08.160(1) (Supp. 1978) provides that small loan companies can charge a rate of
finance charge of 30% per year on amounts loaned of up to $500, 18% on the next $500, and 12%
on any amounts over $1,000.
67. Id. § 31.08.160 (Supp. 1978).
68. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
69. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.14.020, .150 (1976).
70. Rule for the Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.2
(1978).
71. See Crandall, The Wisconsin ConsumerAct: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and
After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 362-65 (1973).
72. See Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022 (1976).
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c. Consumer Loan by a Small Loan Company
Assume again that Mike Little wants to purchase a television on
credit from Sally's Appliances. This time, however, Sally's has already
made a decision not to engage directly in the financing of sales. In-
stead, it has a working relationship with Happy Finance whereby it will
refer all its customers directly to Happy Finance. Happy Finance will
then decide whether to approve the requested credit. If credit is ap-
proved, Happy Finance grants a direct loan to Sally's customers, the
proceeds of which will be directly payable to Sally's. Mike is referred
to Happy Finance, who approves Mike's credit. Mike signs a consumer
loan form and security agreement. Sally's receives the proceeds and
goes broke.
Mike is charged the maximum rate of finance charge in Washing-
ton for "small loans" of $500 or less-thirty percent per year.73 No
provision is made for a minimum finance charge because such charges
are not permitted. 4 There is, however, a provision for the maximum
permissible delinquency charge, and the signed "agreement" provides
for the maximum. The small loan law specifies a maximum delin-
quency charge equivalent to "the portion of the precomputed charge
applicable to the final installment period" if a scheduled installment is
"in default more than seven days."7 5
Mike is considered in default after he misses two payments, for
which the finance company levies a delinquency charge. Mike autho-
rizes Happy Finance to repossess the television.7 6 Happy Finance re-
possesses the television, sells it and sues Mike for a deficiency
judgment.7
Mike finds his way to a legal services attorney. Mike is almost
broke but wishes to avoid losing what little he has and asks the attorney
to fight the deficiency action. The attorney tries to determine the appli-
cability of section 62A.9-501(l). 78 He learns that lenders in the position
of Happy Finance do not feel the section serves to limit their deficiency
actions because when there is a direct loan no "seller" is involved. 79
73. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 31.08.160(1) (Supp. 1978).
74. Id. §§ 31.08.160(l), .200.
75. Id. § 31.08.160(3)(d).
76. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 54 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
79. The type of security interest taken by the lender would have been considered a chattel
mortgage prior to the passage of the UCC. Given the assumed legislative history of § 62A.9-
501(1), it is presumed that there is no limitation on deficiency judgments when a security interest
19791
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Mike's attorney might argue that the close relationship of the seller and
the lender should make the lender subject to the no-deficiency-judg-
ment limitation of section 62A.9-501. There is, however, no Washing-
ton statute or case authority on point. Washington's entirely separate
treatment of sales and direct loans is typical of states with the scattered
approach although such treatment perpetuates anomalous results and
does little to promote understanding of the law.
d Consumer Loan by a Slate Chartered Bank
Assume that instead of first going to Sally's, Mike finds his way to
the New State Bank and informs the loan officer that he wants to bor-
row three hundred dollars for a new television. New State Bank tells
Mike that they will be glad to loan him the money as soon as he tells
them where he is going to buy the television. Mike leaves, finds the
television he wants at Sally's and tells Sally's manager that he will re-
turn.
Mike returns to New State Bank and receives a loan of three hun-
dred dollars, with the proceeds in the form of a check payable to Mike
and Sally's.8 ° Mike signs a "loan agreement," which includes a security
agreement. The "agreement" provides for a maximum rate of finance
charge of twelve percent per annum or, in the alternative, for a mini-
mum charge, designed as a "setup charge," of twelve dollars. In addi-
tion, the bank provides for a delinquency charge of five percent or ten
dollars, whichever is less.
Mike misses two payments, for which delinquency charges are lev-
ied. The bank repossesses the television with Mike's permission, sells
the television and sues for a deficiency. This time, Mike's attorney cor-
rectly concludes there is indeed no limitation on deficiency judgments
because there is not even a close relationship here between the lender
and seller.81 The maximum rate and "setup charge" are found to be
proper. 82 The attorney, however, finds no authorization for delin-
quency charges in the usury statute or elsewhere and asks the court to
offset from the bank's deficiency request penalties, for this violation of
in the form of a pre-UCC chattel mortgage is taken. Although a "purchase money loan" is
granted, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-107(b) (1966), lenders, despite the close relationship
with sellers like that present in the instant case, do not feel they are "sellers" as required for the
application of § 62A.9-501(I). See note 59 supra.
80. This ensures New State Bank's status as a purchase money creditor. See WASH. ReV.
CODE ANN. § 62A.9-107(b) (1966).
81. See notes 55, 59 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
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the usury statute, equivalent to all interest earned plus twice the
amount of all interest paid.
83
There is indeed no statutory authorization under the general usury
rate or elsewhere for delinquency charges on loans by banks, but they
are regularly charged in Washington. Arguably, delinquency charges
should not be considered as part of the finance charge used in calculat-
ing the rate because the Truth in Lending Act, for purposes of disclo-
sure,8 4 and the Washington Credit Disclosure Act, for purposes of
determining whether the "service charge" is within the specified maxi-
mum rate, 5 specifically exclude such charges from the finance charge.
By analogy, therefore, reasonable delinquency charges should be ex-
cluded from the finance charge under Washington's general usury rate.
This issue, like so many others, is left unanswered by Washington stat-
utes and case law.
If Mike had purchased the television from Sally's pursuant to a
credit card issued by New State Bank, the maximum rate available to
the bank would once again be limited to twelve percent per annum.8 6
Most banks in Washington also levy a minimum finance charge each
month on credit card transactions from one dollar per month, when the
credit card is used to purchase goods, to as much as four dollars per
transaction, when the credit card is used for a withdrawal of cash.87 It
is presumed banks find the authorization for these charges from the
general usury rate's "setup charge." The general usury statute, in rele-
vant part, states:
Provided, That in any loan of money in which the funds advanced do
not exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, a setup charge may be
charged and collected by the lender, and such setup charge shall not
be considered interest hereunder:
Providedfurther, That such setup charge does not exceed four per-
cent of the amount of funds advanced, or fifteen dollars, whichever is
the lesser, except that on loans of under one hundred dollars a mini-
mum not exceeding four dollars may be so charged. 8
The purpose of the setup charge is to provide a minimum charge
that will reimburse the creditor for initial write-up costs that are fixed
83. Id. § 19.52.030.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(d)(4) (1976), interpreted in Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. 226.4(c) (1978).
85. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 63.14.010(8) (Supp. 1978).
86. See id. § 19.52.020 (1978).
87. The $4.00 charge, for example, is levied when a customer uses a credit card in an auto-
matic teller machine and receives a dispersal of cash from the machine.
88. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020 (1978).
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whatever the amount of the loan. This charge, however, was appar-
ently only intended to apply to traditional closed-end, nonrevolving
loans in which it is a one-shot charge.89 It is, therefore, questionable
whether the present banking practice of levying a monthly setup charge
for a revolving loan was ever specifically contemplated by the legisla-
ture or covered by the statute's purpose. At any rate, the Washington
Legislature has also left the legal resolution of this issue to guesswork.
The above examples demonstrate that designing a road map to the
state's consumer credit laws is not a simple task when a state has a
scattered approach to consumer credit regulation. Also, only the
Washington law on the issues of the maximum rate of finance charge,
the minimum finance charge, delinquency charges, and the availability
of a deficiency judgment were considered. Yet, to find the applicable
law, a person was required to wade through Washington's version of a
retail installment sales act, small loan law, general usury law, and a
provision of the UCC made directly applicable in Washington to cer-
tain consumer credit transactions. Even with a thorough search of the
statutes, the incompleteness of the Washington statutes and the sepa-
rate treatment of the different transactions required a good deal of
guesswork in determining the applicable law.
If one searched out the applicable law in another scattered ap-
proach state, he might find even more confusion. For example, note in
the first hypothetical that the maximum rate of finance charge is the
same in Washington for a credit sale whether or not it is open-end ("re-
tail charge agreement") or other than open-end ("retail installment
contract"). 90 In North Carolina the maximum rate of finance charge
for an open-end credit sale is eighteen percent per year,9' but for an
other than open-end credit sale it is twenty-two percent per year.92
This too is qualified. If the credit sale of an automobile that is repay-
able in six or more installments is involved, the maximum rate is
twenty-nine percent per annum.93
Likewise, as discussed in the last hypothetical, although the maxi-
mum rate of finance charge of twelve percent per annum for an other
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1976), for a definition of "open-end credit plan." Whereas an
"open-end" plan contemplates ongoing transactions "from time to time," closed-end credit does
not, as, for example, in the typical installment loan in which the amount borrowed plus precom-
puted finance charges is to be repaid at a specified date in the future.
90. See text accompanying notes 47 & 49 supra.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. Id. § 25A-15 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
93. Id.
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than open-end bank loan is the same in Washington as that for an
open-end bank loan pursuant to a credit card,94 most states have rates
that differ for such loans. In North Carolina, again, the maximum rate
for the other than open-end bank loans is fifteen percent per year,95 but
for bank loans pursuant to a credit card it is eighteen percent per
year.
96
It is not enough to answer in response to the needless complexity
found with the scattered approach that individual creditors will know
the laws applicable to them. In fact, that is often not the case, and such
a lack of knowledge can have disastrous consequences.97 Of course, a
particular state could revise its statutes piecemeal as irreconcilable
problems with interpretation are found. But the political reality is that
state legislatures are slow to adopt such legislation even when there is
no opposition. Even if credit grantors were able to cope and state legis-
latures quick to respond, the scattered approach would still needlessly
confuse consumers.
Why have the states not adopted a comprehensive code that in one
94. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
96. Id. § 24-11(a).
97. In State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970), the court found that
J.C. Penney was violating Wisconsin's usury statute by charging an 18% rate of finance charge on
transactions in which the customer utilized a Penney's issued charge card. Penney's lawyers had
mistakenly interpreted the usury law by treating its finance charge for card transactions as a
"time-price differential" not subject to the usury statute. See note 29 and accompanying text
supra. This mistake was understandable; Wisconsin had the scattered approach at the time of the
decision and it was unclear what statute, or indeed whether any statute, was applicable to charge
cards.
The statutory penalty in Wisconsin for a violation of the state usury statute at the time of the
case included a forfeiture of allprincpal under $2,000. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(1) (West 1974).
No malice on the part of the creditor needed to be shown before recovery, see 48 Wis. 2d at 150-
51, 179 N.W.2d at 655, although an unintentional violation of the usury statute, corrected upon
demand, did not affect enforceability of the contract as corrected, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(5)
(West 1974). All Wisconsin retailers with charge cards were charging the 18% rate at the time of
the Penney's decision and the author quite vividly recalls the understandable panic that JC. Pen-
ney caused. The author was told on a number of occasions by representatives of retailers that the
total monetary penalties that could be levied against all retailers in violation of the usury statute
could exceed $1 billion.
The retailers formed a strong lobby to ensure the passage of what became known both to
proponents and opponents as the "forgiveness bill." It passed in the dying days of the 1972 special
legislative session, Law of May 11, 1972, ch. 308, 1971 Wis. Laws 1238 (codified at Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 138.06(6), (7) (West 1974)), but only after a great deal of expense and worry. In fact, the
J C. Penney decision was also responsible, to some extent, for the passage of the Wisconsin Con-
sumer Act. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101 - 427.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978). The retailer lobby,
as well as all creditor lobbies, was told by then Governor Patrick Lucey that if it did not negotiate
in good faith on a comprehensive consumer credit package the Governor would not sign any
individual items of legislation solely in their interest. The retail lobby assumed this statement
included the "forgiveness bill," and presumably, at least partly for this reason, the retail lobby
negotiated in good faith on the initial version of the Wisconsin Conshmer Act.
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place contains all applicable consumer credit laws whatever the type of
credit grantor? That occured to the National Commissioners of Uni-
form State Laws, who, in 1968, proposed the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) for adoption in every state." The 1968 UCCC
was revised a number of times until, in 1974, the final draft was
adopted by the National Commissioners.9
One of th6 basic assumptions of the drafters of the UCCC was that
"consumer credit legislation should be contained in one law so that any
attorney can quickly and effectively advise his consumer client."' 0
The UCCC drafters felt "only an expert [could] find or understand"
consumer credit law under the scattered approach. 101 One of the un-
derlying purposes of the UCCC was "to simplify, [and] clarify" con-
sumer credit laws.10 2
The UCCC was so drafted that it does contain all legislation di-
rectly relevant to consumer credit transactions as defined therein.
Thus, the relevant consumer credit law in each of the Washington hy-
potheticals discussed above would be decided in a UCCC state under
only the UCCC without resort to a different applicable set of statutes
that are dependent on the type of creditor and/or consumer credit
transaction. By consolidating all consumer credit law into one statute,
the UCCC does indeed simplify and clarify consumer credit law.
The UCCC, if adopted, would also serve to simplify and clarify by
answering most of the unanswered questions raised by the statutes of a
state, such as Washington, with the scattered approach. For example,
as illustrated in the second hypothetical above, it is unclear in Wash-
ington what the maximum rate of finance charge is in a credit sale in
which the retail installment contract is assigned by the seller to a
finance company. 10 3 That rate issue is clearly resolved by the UCCC's
definition of "seller" to include an assignee of the seller's right to pay-
ment."° In the last hypothetical, which involved a closed-end con-
sumer loan by a state chartered bank, it was noted that Washington's
consumer credit laws made no provision for a delinquency charge in
such a transaction.0 5 The UCCC specifically provides for a delin-
98. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1968 version).
99. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE.
100. Id. Prefatory Note (1968 version).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See notes 57-72 and accompanying text supra.
104. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(38).
105. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
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quency charge for all closed-end consumer loans, limited to five dollars
or five percent of the unpaid installment, whichever is less. 10 6
Although the UCCC's comprehensive approach would do much to
simplify and clarify consumer credit regulation, it is not above criti-
cism. The UCCC does contain some difference in treatment between
sales and loans.'07 To some extent this is justified and cannot be
avoided, 08 but the distinction is also retained in sections in which it is
not justified. 0 9 Also, some of the UCCC's substantive provisions leave
much to be desired from a consumer advocate's viewpoint. 110 More-
over, unless it is adopted on a broad scale and in substantially the same
form, the UCCC would not cure the problem of lack of uniformity
among the states."'
Very few states, however, have seen fit to adopt the UCCC or any
other comprehensive approach. The 1968 UCCC has gained full ac-
ceptance in only six states."t 2 Kansas adopted a later version.' The
1974 UCCC has not yet been adopted anywhere. Some states have
adopted comprehensive codes other than the UCCC,"4 but the vast
106. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.502.
107. The 1968 version of the UCCC treated sales and loans entirely separately in articles 2
and 3. The 1974 UCCC, for the most part, has the same substantive provisions for all "consumer
credit transactions." See, e.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.505 (finance charge on
consolidation).
108. Some provisions are not applicable to both loans and sales; for example, the provision on
referral sales. Id. § 3.309.
109. See, e.g., id. § 5.103(l) (limits deficiency judgments in all consumer credit sales in which
the goods purchased have a purchase price of $1,750 or less, but limits deficiency judgments in
loans to purchase such goods only when the lender is closely related to the seller).
110. The most extensive compilation of consumer concerns with the 1974 UCCC can be found
in National Consumer Law Center, Suggested Amendments to the 1974 Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (1974) (unpublished document prepared by the National Consumer Law Center,
Boston, Mass.) (copy on file at University of North Carolina School of Law Library). For a dis-
cussion of the various consumer criticisms directed toward the 1968 UCCC, see D. ROTHCHILD &
D. CARROLL, supra note 31, § 19.06 at 807. Probably the most highly criticized provisions are the
UCCC rate provisions, which, if adopted, would result in significantly higher maximum rates in
most states. For example, § 2.202(3) of the 1974 UCCC would permit a maximum rate of finance
charge on open-end sales of up to 24% per year although most states now limit the maximum rate
on such transactions to 18% per year. See generally I CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) T 630 (1977).
111. See Part 11.4.2. infra.
112. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to -9-103 (1973 & Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-31-
101 to -39-103 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. 24-4.5- 1-101 to 6-202 (Bums 1972 & Supp. 1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN.
70B-l-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1977); WVo. STAT. §§ 40-14-101 to -14-702 (1977).
113. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-l-101 to -9-102 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
114. Iowa Consumer Credit Code, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101-.7103 (Supp. 1978); Louisi-
ana Consumer Credit Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3510-:3571 (West Supp. 1978); Maine Con-
sumer Credit Code, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1.101 to 6-415 (Supp. 1978); South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code, S.C. CODE §§ 37-1-101 to -9-102 (1976 & Supp. 1978); West Virginia
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majority still cling to the cumbersome scattered approach." 5 There are
a number of reasons for this reticence to restructure state consumer
credit regulation into a comprehensive approach. State legislators do
not like to tackle as complex a field as consumer credit, particularly
when it involves undoing years of legislation. With the dearth of ex-
perienced staff and the lack of other legislative resources at the state
level, who can blame them? Also, during the massive revision of con-
sumer credit laws required for the enactment of a comprehensive code,
consumer advocates will seek more protection and argue for lower rates
than creditor advocates. This is a mild summation of what will be a
tough, highly publicized, political fight, which most state legislators
would like to avoid. It is much easier to obtain passage of a limited
amendment of one section of one act, affecting one industry, and
thereby perpetuate the scattered approach.' 1 6
2. Lack of Uniformity
The present approach to consumer credit regulation by the states
.creates problems beyond the mere complexity of any one state's con-
sumer credit statutes. As is evident from the above discussion, states
have substantially different provisions governing the maximum rate of
finance charge, methods of calculating delinquency charges, and con-
sumer protections such as disclosure, prohibited practices or creditors'
remedies. For the interstate creditor, nonuniformity can be costly. It is
not always clear which state's laws are applicable in a credit transaction
involving a consumer in one state and a creditor in a different state.
Moreover, even when a creditor engaged in interstate business knows
which state's laws are applicable, it is costly to tailor separate lending
operations for each state.
A creditor with an office in State X who extends credit in State X
to a borrower who resides in State X is clearly subject to State X's con-
sumer credit laws. As the above discussion on the complexity of state
laws indicates, however, determining each state's consumer credit laws
may be a very difficult and, therefore, costly task. State-by-state com-
pliance typically involves hiring local counsel, maintaining, and keep-
Consumer Credit Protection Act, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (1976 & Supp. 1978);
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101 to .105 (West Supp. 1978).
115. Because there are only 7 UCCC states, plus 6 other states having a comprehensive ap-
proach, 37 states still have the scattered approach.
116. These conclusions are based on the author's lobbying efforts in Wisconsin for consumer
interests on the Wisconsin Consumer Act and other low income issues in 1970-1973, and in Penn-
sylvania on consumer credit and other issues in 1973-1974.
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ing current, separate forms for initiation of a transaction,1 17 and may
involve formulating different collection procedures and employee
training programs. 8 Aldens, Inc., a large mail-order retailer with its
chief place of business in Illinois, has estimated that its cost of compli-
ance with the differing consumer credit laws in all fifty states would be
in excess of $320,000.119 That estimate does not include revenue loss
represented by varying rates of maximum finance charge.120  Obvi-
ously, compliance costs are passed to the consumer in the form of
higher retail prices or finance charges.
When the interstate creditor is also faced with a choice of law
problem, the specter of penalties for failure to comply arises.12' Yet,
there is very little guidance from the courts on choice of law issues.
Assume, for example, that a consumer from State X, because of
the creditor's advertisements in State X, enters into a consumer credit
transaction at the creditor's office in State Y. Consumer, pursuant to
his understanding with the creditor, then returns to State X to spend
the money borrowed or utilize the goods purchased. Creditor charges
the maximum rate of finance charge applicable in State Y--eighteen
percent. The consumer defaults, and the creditor brings an action for
breach of contract. The consumer counterclaims for damages based on
State X's usury law, which limits a creditor to a maximum of twelve
percent. Is the creditor subject to State X's sanctions for violation of
State X's usury law or is the creditor correct in its contention that State
Y's law applies?
The general conflict of laws rule in usury cases has been that a
court should apply the law of the state in which the contract is valid
rather than applying the sanctions of the state that would make the
contract usurious, provided that the state whose usury law is used bears
a normal relationship to the transaction.' 22 Under this general rule,
which supports the validity of a contract, the State Y rate will stand
117. For example, to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, a creditor must alter his disclosures so as to disclose the rate of finance charge levied in
each state. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(4) (1976). Disclosure forms may also differ from state to state
because some states require disclosures in addition to those required by the CCPA. See Part
II.B.2. infra.
118. Several states have quite detailed acts regulating debt collection practices by creditors
enforcing their own obligations. Eg., Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 427 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
119. Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F. Supp. 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 1974), modi ed, 524 F.2d 38 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
120. Id.
121. These can be substantial. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.305 (West 1974) (transaction
void).
122. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 331 (1972).
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even though it is higher than the State X rate.'23 The obvious effect of
this rule is to encourage a creditor to contract for the higher rate. That
is problematical from a public policy view. At least, if all courts uti-
lized the rule, it would provide some certainty. But certainty is not to
be found in choice of law issues; the theories used in many jurisdictions
in place of the general validation rule are complex and do little to build
confidence in predicting which state's laws will govern.
Some courts reject the general rule because it is felt that it does not
allow a state to protect its consumers from overreaching.' 24  Other
courts place the greatest significance on the place of the making of the
contract unless the parties agree that another state's laws shall govern,
and there is a reasonable basis for the parties so agreeing.125 The pro-
viso forces inquiry into the relative bargaining power of the contracting
parties. In a consumer credit context, therefore, the proviso inherently
creates reliance problems for the creditor uncertain about a later court's
decision on the bargaining power issue.
Other courts have adopted a significant contacts or center of grav-
ity test. What contacts are the most important thus becomes an is-
sue.' 26 Still other courts use different theories at the same time in a
particular case. For example, in Cooper v. Cherokee Village Develop-
ment Co.,' 27 in which the issue was whether a New York or Arkansas
usury rate was applicable, the court considered five different conflict
theories to come to its decision. 12
Section 203 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is an
attempt to present a universally acceptable rule. The rule states:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of
usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state
to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly
123. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927) (when the court must
choose between the law of the place where the contract is made and the law of the place where the
contract is performed, court should choose the law most favorable to the lender and validate the
contract).
124. See Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity andEffect of Contracts," 4 Compari-
son of English andAmerican Approaches to the Conflict of Lavs, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 635, 681-85
(1973).
125. E.g., Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 239 Ark. 738, 393 S.W.2d 867 (1965).
126. Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Catalano, 51 Misc. 2d 407, 273 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Columbia County
Ct. 1966).
127. 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963).
128. The court considered the following theories: where the contract is "made" or the lex loc
contractus theory, id. at 41-42, 364 S.W.2d at 161-62; the "law of the state in which the contract is
to be performed in its most essential features," id. at 42, 364 S.W.2d at 161; the law of the state to
which the parties agreed as long as that state has a substantial connection, ld.; the general rule of
validation, id. at 45, 364 S.W.2d at 162; and the grouping of contracts theory, id.
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in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state of
the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.129
This rule still leaves complex issues for the courts because of the use of
the terms "not greatly in excess" and "substantial relationship," and
courts have been slow to adopt the section. In the hypothetical dis-
cussed above, for example, the forum court would have to decide
whether the eighteen percent rate of State Y is "not greatly in excess"
of the twelve percent rate of State X. A comment to section 203 states
that if the variance is only a "few" percentage points higher, the higher
rates should still be followed.' 30 How many are a "few" percentage
points? The "greatly in excess" language also raises the issue whether
the court is to compare the maximum rate of finance charge permitted
under each state's statutes or the rate actually charged under the con-
tract at issue with the maximum rate permitted in the other state at
issue. In O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,' 3 ' a majority of the
Washington Supreme Court stated in dictum that, since the maximum
rate of finance charge in New York for the transaction at issue was
25%, the rate "was 'greatly in excess of the [12%] rate permitted by the
general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the
rule of § 188'-the State of Washington." 3 2 The lone dissenting justice
argued that the words "permissible in the state to which the contract
has a substantial relationship" contained in section 203 logically refer
only to the actual rate charged and not to the maximum rate allowed
by statute.1 33 The Restatement rule, then, does little to avoid the confu-
sion in the law.
In response to the confusion with respect to conflicts principles and
to better protect consumers, some states have passed statutes specifi-
cally making their state's law the applicable law if that state is the dom-
icile of the debtor.' 34 Three recent United States Court of Appeals
decisions have upheld the constitutionality of this kind of statute.
In Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 3 Aldens sought injunctive and declara-
tory relief against the enforcement of such a Pennsylvania law. Aldens
is an Illinois corporation not registered in Pennsylvania and with no
assets or employees there. Aldens advertises by mail-order catalog and
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971).
130. Id. § 203, comment b (1971).
131. 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978).
132. Id. at 687, 586 P.2d at 834.
133. Id. at 693, 586 P.2d at 838 (dissenting opinion).
134. E.g., 69 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
135. 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
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flyers, ships all orders F.O.B. to another state and handles all its billing
and credit in Illinois. Aldens' credit agreements are used nationwide
and provide for twenty-one percent interest on a balance of $350 or
less, and twelve precent on one greater than $350.136 The agreement
used by Aldens was valid under Illinois law but not Pennsylvania law,
which limited the maximum rate on consumer credit sales to fifteen
percent.
The court of appeals affirmed Pennsylvania's right to regulate the
rate of interest charged by Aldens to consumers in that state. It was
held that the territorial application statute did not violate any provi-
sions of the United States Constitution. The court found that Penn-
sylvania's interest in protecting its citizens outweighed Illinois'
interests, even though nearly all the relevant contacts were in Illinois.
In considering the burden on interstate commerce, the court noted that
there is a tremendous lack of uniformity among the states 3 7 but that
only Congress could remedy the confusion.13
In the second case, Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollete,t39 Aldens challenged
the Wisconsin Consumer Act's provision on territorial applicability.
The facts were essentially the same as in Packel, and the LaFolletle
court adopted the Packel decision. The court in the third case, A/dens,
Inc. v. Ryan,"I again on similar facts, affirmed Oklahoma's right to
regulate the interest rate Aldens charged to Oklahoma's consumers.
The state territorial applicability statutes at issue in the Aldens
cases do provide a greater degree of certainty for the interstate creditor
in the interstate transaction. But such statutes do not answer all choice
of law issues;' 4 ' nor are they uniform. 142
The problems with state by state compliance and choice of law
136. Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F. Supp. 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
137. 524 F.2d at 48, n.15.
138. Id. at 48-49.
139. 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
140. 571 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 180 (1978).
141. See O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978). This
case was a complicated one involving the issue whether the .usury law of Washington, or that of
two other states, California and New York, was applicable. The plaintiff was a Washington resi-
dent and Washington's usury law provides, in part, as follows:
Whenever a loan or forbearance is made outside Washington state to a person then
residing in this state the usury laws found in chapter 19.52 RCW, as now or hereafter
amended, shall be applicable in all courts of this state to the same extent such usury laws
would be applicable if the loan or forbearance was made in this state.
WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 19.52.034 (1976). Yet, the Washington Supreme Court evidently to-
tally ignored the statute because no mention is made of it in the opinion.
142. Compare 69 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1103 (Purdon Supp. 1978) with Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.201 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 58
FEDERAL CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
issues could be significantly diminished by the adoption of a truly uni-
form consumer credit code. 143 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
was designed to solve the uniformity problem in all fifty states.' 44 As
previously noted, however, the UCCC has been adopted in full in only
seven states, with six adopting the 1968 version and Kansas enacting a
later version. 145
Even those six states who adopted the 1968 version often adopted
significantly different provisions. 46 For example, in the 1968 UCCC
the maximum annual rate of finance charge for other than open-end
consumer credit sales was thirty-six percent on the first $300, twenty-
one percent on the next $700, and fifteen percent on any amount over
$1,000 or a flat rate of eighteen percent. 47 The dollar amounts were to
be subject to change pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar
amounts. 48 Colorado substituted twenty-five percent for thirty-six per-
cent and twenty percent for twenty-one percent. 149 Oklahoma substi-
tuted thirty percent for thirty-six percent.'50 Colorado, Oklahoma and
Wyoming deleted the subsection providing for a change in the dollar
amounts, while Idaho, Utah and Indiana adopted differing provisions
for the adjustment of dollar amounts so that in Idaho and Utah, $300 is
now $540, and $1,000 is now $1,800, while in Indiana, $300 is now
$450, and $1,000 is now $1,500.11 So much for the uniformity that the
UCCC drafters thought would facilitate and reduce the costs of inter-
state operations and maximize the understanding of today's mobile
consumers.'
52
3. Inadequacy of State Consumer Protection Measures
Most states have failed to exercise adequately their current author-
ity over consumer credit transactions by refusing to enact sufficient
consumer protection measures. This is particularly true in consumer
credit transactions secured by personal property of the consumer.
143. Only "significantly diminished," rather than entirely removed, because of the likelihood
of differing opinions by states on identical provisions.
144. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note (1968 version).
145. See notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text supra.
146. Oklahoma made over 200 modifications. See D. ROTHCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note
31, § 19.06 at 811.
147. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.201(2) (1968 version).
148. Id. § 2.201(7). The provision for the adjustment of dollar amounts is at id. § 1.106.
149. See I CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 5635.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note (1968 version).
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Forty-nine states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.-'53
Article 9 of the UCC defines the rights and remedies of a secured credi-
tor and debtor.'54 Although the first drafts of Article 9 contained a
number of consumer protection provisions, 55 they became the subject
of a great deal of criticism. 156 The draftsmen, therefore, decided to
leave consumer protection to state consumer credit legislation such as
retail installment sales acts. 57 The UCC was rewritten to provide that
state consumer credit regulation would not be repealed by the UCC's
passage.' 58 As illustrated by the following examples, however, most
states have failed to amend their consumer credit laws to fill the con-
sumer protection gaps left in Article 9.
a. Defining "Default"
Under Article 9 of the UCC, when the debtor defaults, the secured
creditor has the right to reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or
otherwise enforce the security interest. 59 The creditor may repossess,
with or without judicial process, any collateral of the debtor 60 and
then sell the repossessed collateral.16' Despite these obviously signifi-
cant consequences of default, the UCC does not define the term. The
reason for this omission is the UCC's strong bias for the "freedom of
contract" principle.'62 A default occurs when the parties' "agreement"
states that it occurs. In the typical consumer credit transaction, how-
ever, an "agreement" is not reached through "freedom" of contract. As
stated by the National Commission on Consumer Finance:
[T]he time has come to recognize that in consumer credit transactions
the creditor's ability to use a full range of collection devices is not a
matter for creditor-debtor negotiation but a set of contractual condi-
tions imposed by the creditor on 'a take-it-or-leave-it basis.' The dis-
parity in bargaining power between creditor and debtor in consumer
153. Louisiana has yet to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code as such. However, articles 1,
3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the UCC have been adopted in substance. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to
:8-501 (West Supp. 1978).
154. See U.C.C. § 9-102.
155. See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 27, 45 (1951).
156. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 293 (1965).
157. Gilmore, supra note 155, at 45.
158. U.C.C. § 9-203(2), Official Note. See V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, COMMERCIAL
LAW: SELECTED STATUTES 483 (1976).
159. U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
160. Id. § 9-503.
161. Id. § 9-504(1).
162. See id. § 1-102(3) and Official Comment 2; V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, supra note
158, at 20, 22.
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transactions is a fact of the marketplace .... 163
What constitutes a "default" in a typical secured consumer credit
transaction, then, is what the creditor says constitutes a default.164 The
term is generally defined broadly to include the consumer's failure to
obey any covenant such as the obligation to pay when due, to keep
insurance on the collateral and to avoid any activity that makes the
creditor feel "insecure."' 165 The definition of default imposed by the
creditor is most often coupled with a provision enabling a creditor to
accelerate the entire obligation immediately upon the occurrence of
any default.' 66  In the case of missed installments, an acceleration
clause serves the valid purpose of allowing the creditor upon default to
sue on the entire obligation rather than suing for each installment as it
comes due. When the customer has no right to cure the default, how-
ever, a creditor can conceivably refuse to accept a payment that is only
one day late and insist on payment of the full amount of the debt. Or
the creditor may, when there is no right to cure, refuse to allow the
debtor to remedy some other default under the contract, such as failure
to insure the collateral.'
67
163. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
164. Shuchman, Consumer Credit by .4dhesion Contracts, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 132 (1962).
165. The following terms from a form contract are representative:
DEFAULT. Time is of the essence and in any of the following events, hereinafter called
"Events of Default," to wit:
(a) Any failure by Buyer to pay when due the full amount of any payment, taxes,
insurance premium, or other indebtedness or charges which are or may be secured
hereby; or
(b) Any failure by Buyer to perform as required by any covenant or agreement
herein; or
(c) The falsity of any representation by Buyer herein or in any credit application
or financial statement given by Buyer to Seller as the basis for any extension of credit
secured hereby; or
(d) If the property should be seized or levied upon under any legal or governmen-
tal process against Buyer or against the property; or
(e) If Buyer becomes insolvent or is the subject of a petition in bankruptcy either
voluntary or involuntary or in any other proceeding under the Federal Bankruptcy
Laws; or makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors; or if Buyer is named in or the
property is subjected to a suit for the appointment of a receiver, or
(f) Loss, substantial damage to, or destruction of any portion of the property; or
(g) If Seller deems the property in danger of misuse or confiscation, or in case
(h) The Seller deems itself insecure;
Then and in any of such events of default, the entire amount of the unpaid purchase
price and other charges and indebtedness secured hereby shall then or at any time there-
after, at the option of the Seller, become immediately due and payable without notice or
demand, and Seller shall have an immediate right to pursue the remedies herein pro-
vided.
Conditional Sales Contract and Security Agreement (Motor Vehicle), Washington Bankers Asso-
ciation, Form U.C.C. 8Z (rev. ed. Dec. 1972).
166. See id.
167. See id.
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Because of the potential for creditor abuse in defining default too
restrictively and in unreasonably denying the debtor's offer to cure a
default, the National Commission on Consumer Finance recom-
mended curative state legislation providing that, whatever the terms of
an "agreement," default would not occur because of technical viola-
tions, creditors would not be allowed to accelerate a debt solely because
of their alleged "insecurity," and debtors would be given notice of an
alleged default followed by fourteen days in which to cure the default
before the creditor would be allowed to accelerate.168 Similar provi-
sions were proposed by the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 169 and by the Na-
tional Consumer Law Center in the 1973 Model Consumer Credit
Act.17 0 Wisconsin has had legislation like that suggested by the NCCF
since 1973.1T1 Yet forty states have taken no action in limiting the
events constituting default or in granting a reasonable period in which
to cure a default. 17 2
b. Restrictions on Security Interests
All states exempt certain kinds of property from levy of execution
on judgment and also from the debtor's estate available for distribution
to unsecured creditors in insolvency proceedings. 73 The purpose of
these statutes is to ensure that the debtor can retain certain necessities
despite his misfortune in losing a judicial action or being declared in-
solvent. 174 State exemption statutes, however, do not exempt such ne-
168. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
169. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.109-. 111.
170. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT §§ 7.102, .103, .108 (1973).
171. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.103-.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978). A comparison of the prov-
sions in the Wisconsin Consumer Act, NCCF recommendations, and the 1974 UCCC is found in
Crandall, Proposalfor Consumer Credit Re/orm: A Dqfnition of Default, a Right to Cure, and a
Right to Notice and an Opporlunity/or a Hearing Be/ore Repossession, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 9-16
(1977).
172. See Appendix infra.
173. D. EPSTEIN, TEACHING MATERIALS ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 230 (1973); see
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 522, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in I 1
U.S.C. § 522). The new federal Bankruptcy Act, effective Oct. 1, 1979, establishes federal exemp-
tions, 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 1979), that preempt state exemptions unless a state enacts legis-
lation specifically providing that federal exemptions are not controlling, id. § 522(b)(1).
174. A stronger statement of their purpose is found in Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash. 179, 182,
86 P. 392, 394 (1906):
The purposes of a constitutional provision or statute allowing exemptions are to prevent
the weak from being overreached by the strong, to prevent pauperism, to guard the im-
pecunious from their want of caution, to protect the families and other dependents of
persons to whom exemptions are allowed, to guard the improvident and unfortunate
against penury and want, and to save the state and the community from the burden and
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cessities from the rights of the Article 9 secured creditor. 7 5 Whatever
the protected status of the property under exemption statutes, personal
property subject to an Article 9 security interest is subject to the credi-
tor's right of repossession upon default. Creditors regularly take blan-
ket security interests in household goods that have no real market
value.' 76 A blanket lien "gives the creditor in terrorem leverage over
what may be a legitimately dissatisfied or recalcitrant debtor since the
creditor may threaten extreme deprivation to induce the consumer to
acquiesce in his demands, whether reasonable or not."' 17 7 The FTC
noted the following reference to the use of blanket security interests in
one of the training manuals of a major small loan company:
Chase and recheck is a psychological device in which the Dial Office
representative visits the uncooperative customer's home specifically
for the purpose of rechecking the security. A complete list of the
furniture or details of the furniture is made (note-this was also done
at the time the loan was made). .... Normally, this will arouse con-
cern on the part of the customer as to the reason for the rechecking.
You are not to threaten that your branch is ready to repossess the
security; merely, [sic] advise the customer that you do not know the
reason for the recheck, that you are just carrying out an assignment,
and that if you were in similar circumstances, you would contact the
office immediately.'7 8
The National Commission on Consumer Finance recommended
in 1972 that creditors not be allowed to take any security interests in
consumer credit sales other than a purchase money security interest in
the goods purchased. 17 9 The 1974 UCCC contains a similar limita-
tion. 80 The 1973 Model Consumer Credit Act'' and the 1973 Wiscon-
sin Consumer Act,'8 2 in addition to the NCCF recommended
limitation in consumer credit sales, contain limits on security interests
disagreeable consequences that experience has shown to be a natural result of laws sub-
jecting all of the property of debtors to the demands of their creditors.
175. This is by statute in most states, see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1122 (Supp. 1978),
and by case law in others, see, e.g., United States v. Elliot, 209 F. Supp. 374 (D. Colo. 1962). See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West 1979). Although the Bankruptcy
Reform Act does provide some protection, see note 173 supra, the federal exemptions do not
exempt any of the debtor's property that is subject to a purchase money security interest or any
automobile of the debtor, whatever the nature of the security interest. Id. at § 522(0(2).
176. See Federal Trade Commission Staff Study Relating to Proposed Trade Regulation Rule
Defining Certain Creditor Remedies as Unfair Trade Practices 232 (Apr. 19, 1974) (unpublished
memorandum on file at Federal Trade Commission Office, Washington, D.C.).
177. Id. at 233-34.
178. Id. at 254 n.44 (cited by the FTC as "Dial Financial Corp., Collection Dues 27.").
179. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
180. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.301.
181. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.411.
182. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.417 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
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in consumer loans. Thirty states, however, still have no legislation re-
stricting what property of the debtor may be made the subject of a se-
curity interest in consumer credit sales.' 83
c. Restrictions on Se/-Help Repossession
Article 9 of the UCC allows a creditor to repossess collateral sub-
ject to a security interest without judicial action-that is, to repossess
by self-help.'8 4 The only limitation on this right in Article 9 is that a
creditor may not "breach the peace."'85 At no time before losing col-
lateral is the debtor entitled to assert before an independent tribunal
that he is not in default. For example, whether the debtor's defense is
based on the creditor's failure to properly credit a payment, or the cred-
itor's failure to credit a setoff available to the debtor because of a
breach of warranty claim,"8 6 the debtor faces the loss of his property
interest in secured collateral without having the opportunity to raise the
defense before anyone other than the creditor.
In addition, self-help repossession as authorized by the UCC
serves to lessen public respect for our system of law and to create a real
possibility for violence. Grant Gilmore, the principal draftsman of ar-
ticle 9 of the UCC, had this to say about prejudgment repossession:
In the financing of business debtors repossession causes little trouble
or dispute. In the underworld of consumer finance, however, repos-
session is a knockdown, drag-out battle waged on both sides with
cunning guile and a complete disregard for the rules of fair play. A
certain amount of trickery seems to be accepted: it is all right for the
finance company to invite the defaulting buyer to drive over to its
office for a friendly conference on refinancing the loan and to repos-
sess the car as soon as he arrives.' 8 7
The following is by an independent contractor who repossesses for
creditors for a flat fee of $35-$45 per repossession:
I was under the hood of this Continental one evening last summer
connecting the wires when this man ran out of the house waving a
.38. This guy did not know what was going on-he didn't speak a
word of English and I mean he was rippin'.
He came back later with his o' lady-who understood Eng-
183. See Appendix infra.
184. U.C.C. § 9-503.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 2-717, for example, gives the buyer, upon notification to the seller, the right to
deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part of
the price still due.
187. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 156, § 44.1, at 1,212.
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lish-and paid the bill. This particular car was $45. I almost took a
thirty-eight slug for $45. 188
In 1972, the National Commission on Consumer Finance recom-
mended that states adopt legislation ensuring that prior to repossession,
whether with or without judicial process, the debtor be given notice of
the claim against him and the opportunity to be heard on the merits of
the underlying claim.'8 9 The 1973 Model Consumer Credit Act con-
tains an abbreviated judicial process, ensuring notice and a right to a
hearing on the issue of default before repossession.19 Since 1973, Wis-
consin has provided for such an abbreviated preseizure process.' 9 '
Forty-three states, however, have yet to place any restrictions beyond
the UCC "no breach of the peace" limitation on the creditor's right to
take possession of collateral without judicial action.' 92
d Restrictions on Deficiency Judgments
Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a secured
party after repossession to sell the collateral and apply the proceeds to
(1) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding and selling; (2) the sat-
isfaction of the indebtedness secured; and (3) the satisfaction of any
subordinate security interests. Should the proceeds of the sale be insuf-
ficient to meet the above obligations, the debtor is personally liable for
the deficiency."' The sale of repossessed collateral may be at a public
or private sale.' 94 The UCC provides that proof that a better price
could be obtained by a sale at a different time or by a different method
from that selected by the secured party is insufficient to show that the
sale is improper. 9'
Professor Philip Shuchman traced eighty-three automobile repos-
sessions in Connecticut' 96 and found that the price obtained at repos-
188. SPOKANE COMMUNITY PRESS, September 21, 1977, at 3.
189. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
190. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT §§ 7.205-.206.
191. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.203, .205 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978). Empirical studies on the
effects of requiring pre-seizure notice and hearing before repossession can be found in Crandall,
supra note 171, at 57-64, 69-71; Johnson, Denial ofSelf-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis,
47 S. CALIF. L. REv. 82 (1973). See also Whitford & Laufer, The Impact ofDenying Self-Help
Repossession of.4utomobiles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer .4ct, 1975 Wis. L. REv.
607.
192. See Appendix infra.
193. U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
194. Id. § 9-504(3).
195. Id. § 9-507(2).
196. Shuchman, Proflt on De/ault: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale,
22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 57-61 (1969).
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session sales averaged only fifty-one percent of retail and seventy-one
percent of the established wholesale price.19 7 This compared to ninety
percent of the wholesale price for used cars sold by automobile dealers
at weekly auctions. 198 John Firmin and Robert Simpon, in testing Pro-
fessor Shuchman's thesis, studied 106 traceable repossessions and 284
court-recorded deficiency suits.' 99 They found that resold automobiles
in Washington, D.C. brought sixty-two percent of the retail price and
eighty-one percent of the wholesale price.200 In seventy-one percent of
the cases, the dealer who had originally sold the auto to the debtor
repurchased it at the sale.201
Because the UCC provisions and creditor practices promote defi-
ciencies rather than keeping them at a minimum, the National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance in 1972 recommended that when the
cash price of goods purchased is over a specified dollar amount no defi-
ciency judgment be allowed.20 2 The 1974 UCCC contains essentially
the same limitation.2 3 The 1973 Model Consumer Credit Act2° and
the 1973 Wisconsin Consumer Act 20 5 contain even more restrictive lim-
itations. Although the states have shown more activity in this area than
those previously discussed, twenty-six states have yet to adopt any spe-
cial restrictions on deficiency judgments.20 6
B. Federal Law
Although consumer credit regulation remains primarily a matter
of state law, federal law is playing an ever-increasing role. In 1968,
Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).2 °7
While initially the CCPA primarily required credit cost disclosure,20 8
the CCPA now contains titles providing equal credit opportunities,20 9
197. Id. at 31.
198. Id. at 44-45.
199. Note, Business as Usual- An Empirical Study ofAutomobile Deficiency Judgement Suits in
the District of Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REv. 511 (1971).
200. Id. at 518 (Table 1).
201. Id. at 517.
202. NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30.
203. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103.
204. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT § 7.208.
205. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.209 (West 1974).
206. See Appendix infra.
207. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-
1693) (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976)).
208. Id. tit. I (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1976)).
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976).
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regulation of debt collection practices210 and consumer protection from
potential problems arising in the electronic transfer of funds.2 1 The
Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a rule designed to pre-
serve consumer claims and defenses with respect to third-party
financiers of consumer credit transactions212 and has proposed a more
comprehensive rule prohibiting certain creditor practices.21 3 Other fed-
eral laws of long standing, such as the Bankruptcy Act214 and the Na-
tional Banking Act,2" 5 are also relevant in consumer credit regulation.
There are three major problems with the present system of federal
regulation. First, the National Banking Act allows federally chartered
banks to ignore state usury rate limitations on banks. Second, it is
often unclear to what extent federal consumer credit regulation
preempts state law. Third, the Federal Trade Commission has shown
an increased willingness to regulate by rule in matters traditionally left
to the states, and regulation by FTC rule is not the most effective
means of regulation.
1. National Banks
In part, section 85 of the National Banking Act provides:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evi-
dences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State,
Territory, or District where the bank is located, . . . except that
where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks
organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for
associations organized or existing in any such State under this chap-
ter.
21 6
Assume that Bank A is a state chartered bank, Bank B is a feder-
ally chartered bank, and both banks are located in State X. State X's
consumer credit law provides for a general contractual usury rate of ten
percent but a rate for bank loans of twelve percent. Section 85 clearly
permits Bank B, the federally chartered bank, to charge the twelve per-
210. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692o (West Supp. 1979).
211. Id. §§ 1693-1693r (West Supp. 1979).
212. 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1978).
213. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
214. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1101 (West Supp. 1979). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, (effective Oct. 1979) was enacted on Nov. 6, 1978 to replace the 1898
Bankruptcy Act. For a discussion of the consumer protection aspects of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,
see D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 31, §§ 11.01-.03 (1977).
215. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976).
216. Id. § 85 (1976).
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cent rate allowed state banks.2 17 Federally chartered banks, however,
are not limited under section 85 to the usury rate applicable to state
chartered banks if any other type of creditor may charge a higher rate.
For example, if small loan companies in State X are entitled to charge a
maximum rate of thirty percent, so is the federally chartered bank, but
Bank A would be limited by state law to the twelve percent rate.218
This does little to foster understanding of consumer credit laws and
arguably creates an unfair competitive advantage for federally
chartered banks.2 19
Section 85 also serves to create problems in interstate transactions
by federally chartered banks. In Marquette National Bank v. First of
Omaha Service Cor. ,22 plaintiff asked the Court to declare unlawful
the federally chartered Omaha bank's practice of charging its Minne-
sota charge card customers the Nebraska rate of finance charge of
eighteen percent. Minnesota statutes provide that "national banking
association[s] doing business in this state" are limited to twelve per-
cent.22' The Omaha bank was clearly doing business in Minnesota,
utilizing agents in Minnesota to offer Minnesota residents charge cards
issued by the Omaha bank.222 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, refused to declare the practice unlawful, stating that the usury
rate for banks in a state where a national bank is doing business is
irrelevant. The Court held that the only law that is relevant is the law
of the state in which the bank "is located. '223 Since the Omaha bank
was located in Nebraska, the Court allowed it to charge the rate per-
mitted in that state.
Contrast this decision with the three Aldens decisions discussed
previously.224 Three different federal Circuit Courts of Appeals held
that Aldens was subject to the maximum usury rate in the three states
where it was doing business because of the territorial applicability pro-
visions of those states, regardless of the law in the state where Aldens
was located. Of course, the Aldens cases can be distinguished from
Marquette because of the applicability of section 85 of the National
217. See United Mo. Bank, N.A. v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
218. See First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 879-80 (8th Cir. 1975).
219. See Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
749, 755-60 (1966).
220. 99 S. Ct. 540 (1978).
221. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.185 (West Supp. 1979).
222. 99 S. Ct. at 547-48.
223. Id. at 545-46.
224. See notes 135-140 and accompanying text supra.
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Banking Act in Marquette. But the conflicting results further interfere
with the development of an understanding of consumer credit law.
Also, as admitted by the Supreme Court in Marquette, the exportation
of interest rates by national banks via credit card offerings will signifi-
cantly impair the ability of states to enact effective usury laws.225
2. Federal Preemption
The major attempt at direct federal regulation of consumer credit
transactions is the Consumer Credit Protection Act.226 The best known
provisions of that act require the disclosure of the credit terms of con-
sumer credit transactions. 227 These "Truth in Lending Act" provisions
are intended to preempt state law to the extent state law is "inconsis-
tent" with federal law.228 Problems with interpretation arise in at-
tempting to determine when a state law is inconsistent. The
determination is an important one. Consistent state disclosures may be
disclosed along with Truth in Lending disclosures as "additional infor-
mation" so long as they do not "mislead or confuse the customer...
or contradict, obscure, or detract attention from the information re-
quired by ... [Regulation Z] to be disclosed. 22 9 Inconsistent state
disclosures may also be made, but they are subject to additional disclo-
sure requirements. Regulation Z provides in part:
Any creditor .. .who elects to make disclosures specified in any
provision of State law, which ... is inconsistent with the require-
ments of the Act and [Regulation Z] may
(1) Make such inconsistent disclosures on a separate paper apart
from the disclosures made pursuant to [Regulation Z], or
(2) Make such inconsistent disclosures on the same statement on
which disclosures required by [Regulation Z] are made; provided:
(i) All disclosures required by [Regulation Z] appear sepa-
rately and above any other disclosures,
(ii) Disclosures required by [Regulation Z] are identified by a
clear and conspicuous heading indicating that they are made in com-
pliance with Federal law, and
(iii) All inconsistent disclosures appear separately and below a
conspicuous demarcation line, and are identified by a clear and con-
225. 99 S. Ct. at 550-51.
226. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976).
227. Id. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
228. Id. § 1610(a).
229. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c) (1978). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has
the duty to prescribe regulations to carry out the purpose of title I of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Regulation Z contains these regulations. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a)
(1978).
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spicuous heading indicating that the statements made thereafter are
inconsistent with the disclosure requirements of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act.230
The creditor who includes state disclosures with Truth in Lending
disclosures does so at some risk. If a court should determine that the
state mandated disclosure is inconsistent with or "detracts attention
from" federal disclosures, the creditor may be in violation of the Truth
in Lending Act for failing to make the disclosures on a separate paper
or below a conspicuous demarcation line.23' On the other hand, if the
creditor should entirely omit a state disclosure, believing it to be incon-
sistent, he runs the danger of being held in violation of state law for
failing to comply with a law that was not affected or annulled by the
Truth in Lending Act. The prudent course for the creditor would seem
to be to list all doubtful state disclosures, separately labeling them as
inconsistent with federal law where necessary. But this approach is
likely to be confusing to the consumer who is now left to decide which
of the inconsistent disclosures he should consider in comparing the cost
of credit. Partial federal preemption tends to frustrate the Truth in
Lending Act's purpose of providing "meaningful disclosures. '23 2
There are advantages to the interstate creditor of a truly national
Truth In Lending law. Compliance costs are lower and interpretation
problems are not compounded by a multiplicity of state laws. 233 These
advantages are significantly lessened, however, by the Truth In Lend-
ing Act provision that exempts a state from the Act for a "class of credit
transactions" if the Federal Reserve Board determines that the state's
laws for the class of transactions are "substantially similar" to those of
the Act, and there is "adequate" provision for enforcement.234
3. Regulation of Consumer Credit by Federal Trade Commission
Rule
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission took its first major plunge
into the substantive law of consumer credit by promulgating the rule
for preservation of consumers' claims and defenses. 235 The rule at-
230. Id. § 226.6(c) (1978).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
232. Id. § 1601.
233. See Part III.4.2. supra.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1976); see, e.g., 35 Fed. Reg. 7550 (1970) (granting an exemption to
Oklahoma); id. at 10,358 (Massachusetts); id. at 11,992 (Connecticut); 37 Fed. Reg. 24,105 (1972)
(Wyoming).
235. 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1978).
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tempted to establish by federal law a consumer right not provided by
some states236-- the right of consumer purchasers of goods on credit to
raise defenses against the third-party financiers of the transactions de-
spite the insulation of such doctrines as the holder in due course.2 37
The FTC should be commended for its action in attempting to provide
needed consumer protection ignored by some states, but regulation by
FTC rule is not the most effective method of federal regulation.
It is unclear, for example, whether there is a private right of action
for the violation of FTC rules.238  Although the FTC may bring an
action for private redress, 239 limitations of staff and funds would indi-
cate that the FTC will probably bring these actions only when the
wronged consumer can show he is part of a large class injured by the
alleged violator. 40 Without a right of private action, the consumer has
no right to pick his own counsel, must face administrative red tape and
delay, and has no ultimate say in what settlement is acceptable.24
Without private actions, there is some question about how adequate
compliance will be inasmuch as administrative enforcement by the
FTC has been highly criticized in the past.24 2
Another problem with regulation by FTC rule is that the Federal
Trade Commission has no power to issue rules that regulate banks.24 3
The Federal Trade Commission Act provides that within sixty days af-
236. See Crandall, The Wisconsin ConsumerAct: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and
After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 386-394 (Appendix 4) (list of states that had made some modifica-
tion to the holder in due course doctrine as of 1973).
237. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1978).
238. The majority of cases say there is no private right of action. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill Ltd.
v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th
Cir. 1973); Holloway v. Bristol Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Comment, 69
Nw. U.L. REv. 462 (1974). Contra, Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586-
89 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) gives the FTC primary but not exclusive
jurisdiction). See also White, FT C.: WrongAgencyfor the Job ofAdudication, 61 A.B.A.J. 1242
(1975).
The law in some states providing a private right of action for a violation of a state's prohibi-
tion against unfair or deceptive trade practices includes unfair or deceptive trade practices under
federal law. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1976); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81
Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (1976).
240. See D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 31, § 3.09 at 86-87. The FTC operating
manual states that "[niumbers and types of consumers likely to be adversely affected by the sub-
ject practice/transaction" are to be considered before an FTC investigation commences. Id. (cit-
ing FTC Operating Manual, ch. 3 (1972)).
241. See Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private
Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039, 1040-41 (1968).
242. See Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.J. 777,
826 (1971); NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
243. See 15 U.S.C. 57a(f)(I) (1976).
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ter any rule is promulgated by the FTC, the Federal Reserve Board
must issue "substantially similar" regulations prohibiting acts or prac-
tices of banks that are "substantially similar" to those prohibited by the
FTC rules.2" The Act also provides, however, that the Board is not
required to issue such rules if it finds that the acts or practices of banks
are not unfair or deceptive or that the implementation of similar regu-
lations with respect to banks would seriously conflict with essential
monetary and payment systems policies of the Board.2 45 To the extent
the Board refuses to promulgate rules for banks that are similar to FTC
rules, consumers who happen to borrow from banks rather than other
credit institutions will have less protection merely because of their
choice of creditor.2 46 Also, the "substantially similar" requirement
raises the possibility of nonuniform rules for banks and other creditors.
In addition to the problems with enforcement and FTC jurisdic-
tion, there is a significant problem with the language of the one major
consumer credit rule promulgated. The rule for preservation of con-
sumers' claims and defenses makes it an unfair and deceptive trade
practice in certain consumer credit transactions for the seller to accept
direct loan proceeds between a lender and a consumer unless the agree-
ment for the loan contains a notice to the customer providing that the
lender will be liable for any defenses the consumer might have against
the seller.247 The notice is required only in "purchase money
loans"248-loans in which the seller "(1) refers consumers to the credi-
tor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract, or
business arrangement." 49 For example, if the seller of a color televi-
sion "refers" a customer to a local finance company and the finance
company inserts the requisite notice in its loan agreement, as a matter
of basic contract law, the finance company will be subject to the con-
sumer's defenses because of the terms of the notice. If, however, the
finance company refuses or forgets to insert the notice, there is nothing
in the rule that would serve to make the lender liable for the defenses
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The Federal Reserve Board did not issue a rule for banks similar to the rule for preserva-
tion of consumer claims or defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1978), because the rule does not apply to
lenders, but only to "sellers." The Board has proposed a rule against unfair lending practices by
banks similar to that of the FTC against unfair creditor practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,494 (1975). It is
impossible, however, to determine to what extent a final FRB rule concerning bank practices
would be similar to a final FTC rule concerning lending practices by institutions other than banks
or whether the FRB will issue any final rule at all.
247. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(b) (1978).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 433.1(d).
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of the consumer.250 It would be an unfair and deceptive trade practice
for the seller to accept proceeds from such a loan,25' but it is not an
unfair and deceptive trade practice for the lender to make such a loan.
The FTC, four days after it promulgated the existing rule in 1975,
proposed an amendment that would also make lenders liable for an
unfair and deceptive trade practice for not following the dictates of the
rule,2 2 but that amendment has yet to be promulgated. Although it
may not be convincing to claim that regulation by FTC rule is ineffec-
tive merely because of the significant gap in protection in the current
rule, the FTC's failure to amend the rule before promulgation and its
continued failure to promulgate the amendment for four years after its
discovery indicate that the FTC may not be equipped to adequately
solve recognized problems within its rules.
The efficiency of regulation by FTC rule may also be diminished
by a sentiment shared by many of those regulated-to the extent more
regulation is needed, it should be imposed by elected representatives
rather than administrative agencies. Whether or not one agrees with
this philosophy, it must be argued that, to the extent regulation by rule
is not an accepted method of regulation, respect for and, therefore,
compliance with regulation by rule will suffer.
Another concern about regulation of consumer credit by FTC rule
relates not to its efficacy but to a practical political result of such regu-
lation. Because of the dictates of time, legislative bodies are more
likely to legislate in areas devoid of regulation rather than in areas
where a regulatory "solution" has already been fashioned, even though
the existing solution may well be less effective than that which the legis-
lative body could construct.
The FTC has proposed a rule that would prohibit certain creditor
practices.253 If promulgated, the rule would represent a more signifi-
cant exercise of FTC authority in regulating areas of consumer credit
traditionally left to the states. Among other things, the proposed rule
would limit property subject to security interests254 and provide some
protection from deficiency judgment actions by creditors. 255 These are
250. There are only a few states with consumer credit regulations which make a direct lender
in such a transaction subject to the consumers' defenses. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.408
(West 1974).
251. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(b) (1978).
252. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (1975).
253. See id. at 16,347.
254. Id. (Proposed § 444.2(a)(4)).
255. Id. (Proposed § 444.2(a)(7)).
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areas identified earlier as having been inadequately addressed by state
legislation.256 If the FTC promulgates its rule, however, the ultimate
result may well be that compreh6nsive and effective federal legislation
in these areas may be foreclosed.
III. THE PROPOSAL
To alleviate the problems with the present state-federal system of
consumer credit regulation, Congress should enact a federal consumer
credit code. It is beyond the scope of this article to propose the specific
language for such a code. Nevertheless, some general observations
about what a federal code should contain and a suggested structure for
that code follow.
A federal consumer credit code should be comprehensive, contain-
ing all legislation, to the extent possible, relating to the direct regula-
tion of consumer credit. A comprehensive approach would alleviate
the problems with interpretation inherent in the scattered approach
prevailing in most states.257 The federal code should, for example, in-
lude substantive provisions that preserve consumers' claims and de-
fenses against third-party lenders and that prohibit certain creditor
practices, rather than leaving these matters for the existing Federal
Trade Commission regulation by rule.258 The inclusion of matters sub-
ject to FTC rule in a comprehensive code should also result in more
effective regulation,25 9 particularly if it is assumed that Congress would
provide strong private enforcement provisions similar to those in the
current Consumer Credit Protection Act.260
To the extent possible, a comprehensive federal consumer credit
code should provide the same consumer credit regulation for all credi-
tors similarly organized. For example, nationally chartered banks
should be subject to the same rate limitations as state chartered banks.
This would solve the problems arising from section 85 of the National
Banking Act and its interpretations. 26'
A federal code should clearly state Congress' intent to totally pre-
256. See Parts II-.3.b., d. supra.
257. For a discussion of the problems with noncomprehensive regulation, see Part II4.1.
supra.
258. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1978).
259. For a discussion of the problems involved in regulating consumer credit by FTC rule, see
Part II.B.3. supra.
260. See text accompanying notes 302 & 303 infra.
261. For a discussion of section 85 of the National Banking Act, its interpretations, and result-
ing problems, see Part II.B.1. supra.
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empt direct consumer credit regulation. This would alleviate the
problems caused by fifty nonuniform state laws262 and issues of federal
preemption that arise with the existing provisions of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.263 A federal code should also contain those con-
sumer protections whose need has been established to cure the lack of
adequate consumer protection activity by most state legislatures. 64
To incorporate a comprehensive consumer credit code, the existing
Consumer Credit Protection Act should be repealed and a new Con-
sumer Protection Act adopted. The structure of the new act could ac-
commodate the provisions of the proposed code as follows:
Title L Consumer Credit Transactions
Chapter 1 ............. General Provisions and Definitions
Chapter 2 .............................. Credit Advertising
Chapter 3 ............................. Maximum Charges
Chapter 4 ...................................... Disclosure
Chapter 5 ....... Limitations on Agreements and Practices
Chapter 6 ....................... Preservation of Defenses
Chapter 7 ............................... Consumer Leases
Chapter 8 ............................... Credit Insurance
Chapter 9 .................................. Credit Billing
Chapter 10 ............................... Debt Collection
Chapter 11 ............ Enforcement of Credit Obligations
Chapter 12 .......................... Consumer Remedies
Chapter 13 ................................ Administration
Title I1 Extortionate Extensions of Credit
Title III Restrictions on Garnishment
Title IV Consumer Credit Reporting
Title V Equal Credit Opportunity
Title V. Electronic Funds Transfers
Under the suggested structure, title I of the proposed Consumer
Protection Act would contain relevant provisions of title I (Truth In
Lending) of the current Consumer Credit Protection Act,265 the provi-
sions of existing title V111 66 (Debt Collection Practices), as well as the
262. See Part II-.2. supra.
263. See Part II.B.2. supra.
264. See Part IIA.3. supra.
265. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
266. Id. §§ 1692-1692o.
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provisions added by the proposed federal consumer credit code. Titles
III-VI of the proposed Consumer Protection Act would contain the
other titles of the current Consumer Credit Protection Act with some
renumbering of titles.
As with the existing title I of the CCPA, the scope of proposed title
I should be delineated in chapter 1. Congress should consider, how-
ever, providing a broader scope for a consumer credit code than that
now found in title I of the CCPA. For example, most credit transac-
tions in which the total amount financed exceeds $25,000 are excluded
from the coverage of existing title 1.267 Although there may be some
justification for excluding transactions in which the amount financed is
very high on the theory that individuals engaged in such transactions
can protect themselves, the figure of $25,000 was adopted in 1968 with
the original passage of the CCPA.268 The rate of inflation suggests a
higher figure would now be more reasonable. Proposed chapter I
should also contain Congress' intent to totally preempt consumer credit
regulation, any necessary definitions and any necessary exemptions
from coverage.
Proposed chapter 2 on credit advertising should contain the sub-
stance of the provisions in chapter 3 of title I of the existing CCPA.269
The most hotly contested part of the proposal would be the provi-
sions of chapter 3, which set the maximum rates of finance charge. The
author does not purport to have the answer to the riddle of what the
maximum rate of finance charge should be for any particular transac-
tion. It is suggested, however, that maximum rates should not be set at
a fixed rate. Instead, maximum rates should fluctuate with the money
market. For example, rather than setting a flat maximum rate of eight-
een percent for credit sales, Congress could specify that the maximum
rate of finance charge for credit sales is "X" percent over the monthly
index of long-term United States Government bond yields as regularly
identified and publicized by the administrator of the proposed act.2 70
Neither creditor advocates, consumer advocates, nor members of
Congress should be faced with an ongoing lobbying effort to keep inter-
est rates in proportion to the economic realities from time to time. A
flexible rate would prevent this waste of resources and would en-
267. Id. § 1603(3) (1976).
268. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 104, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1603
(1976)).
269. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1666j (1976).
270. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101(f), 301 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
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courage Congress to initially set a rate that compares with current rates
rather than setting too high a maximum in contemplation of future in-
flation.
Proposed chapter 3 would also contain limitations on, for example,
minimum charges, 7' delinquency charges,272 and permissible addi-
tional charges.273 Although the advisability of and limitation on such
charges have not received as much publicity as the issue of maximum
rates of finance charge, charges other than finance charges are econom-
ically significant to both the creditor and consumer and should be regu-
lated just as closely.
Chapter 4 should contain the substance of all disclosure provisions
of existing chapter 2 of title I of the CCPA274 with the exception of
section 130, which specifies civil liability. 75 For clarity, all penalty
provisions should be contained in the same chapter of the proposal-
chapter 12.276 In addition, any other provisions requiring disclosure,
such as a provision requiring that the creditor disclose to cosigners the
nature of their liability,277 should be contained within the proposed
chapter 4.
Chapter 5, as proposed, would contain provisions that both pro-
hibit the creditor from including certain terms with a harsh result in
credit "agreements" and engaging in certain unfair practices. For ex-
ample, such provisions as a limitation on unequal ("balloon") pay-
ments,278 a prohibition against irrevocable wage assignments279 and
limitations on what collateral may be taken under a security agree-
ment280 should be in chapter 5. Section 167, Use of Cash Discounts,281
271. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.202(4); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.201(8)
(West 1974).
272. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.206; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.203 (West
1974).
273. See, eg., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.204; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.202 (West
1974 & Supp. 1978).
274. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1645 (1976).
275. Id. § 1640.
276. See text accompanying notes 302-306 infra.
277. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ANN. § 422.305 (West 1974); Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on
Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (Proposed § 444.2(b)(1)).
278. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2A02; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.402 (West
1974).
279. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.404 (West 1974).
280. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.411; Wis. STAT:. ANN. § 422.417 (West
1974 & Supp. 1978); Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347
(1975) (Proposed § 444.2(a)(4)).
281. 15 U.S.C. § 1666f (1976).
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and section 168, Prohibition of Tie-in-Services,28 2 of chapter 4 of title I
of the existing CCPA should also be placed in proposed chapter 5.
Chapter 6 would contain all provisions designed to remove the in-
sulation from consumers' defenses of third parties who finance con-
sumer credit transactions. Because of the previously discussed
problems with the FTC rule on preservation of consumers' claims and
defenses, Congress should not enact the provisions of the rule, but in-
stead should adopt a direct limitation on the insulation from liability of
third-party financiers of consumer credit transactions. 83 Chapter 6
should also contain the substance of existing section 170 of title I of the
existing CCPA,284 which makes the issuer of lender credit cards subject
to the cardholders' claims and defenses.
For an increasing number of consumers, leasing is the preferred
method of acquiring automobiles and deferring payment for them.285
Problems encountered by the consumer lessee are often like those of
the consumer in the typical consumer credit sale or purchase money
loan.286 Chapter 5 of existing title I of the CCPA provides protection
for the consumer lessee.287 Under the suggested structure of the pro-
posed CCPA, the substance of these leasing protections could be in-
cluded in chapter 7. Alternatively, the substance of the leasing
provisions of existing chapter 5 could be inserted in other chapters of
the proposal: definitions in chapter 1 of the proposal, disclosures in
chapter 4, lessee's liability in chapter 5, advertising in chapter 2, and
civil liability in chapter 13. Whichever alternative is adopted, existing
section 186, Relation to State Laws,2 88 would not be necessary because
of the proposed provision on complete federal preemption recom-
mended for inclusion in proposed chapter 1.
282, Id. § 1666g.
283. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT §§ 2.601-.604.
284. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1976).
285. In 1973, automobile manufacturers estimated that by 1980 some 40% of their production
would be leased rather than sold. In the last ten years, lease and fleet registrations on new cars
have increased 127%, while new car sales have increased only 42%. Truth-in-Lending Annual
Report to Congress for the Year 1973 by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
reprintedin INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE (CCH) Issue No. 271, Part II, 14-15 (Jan. 16, 1974).
The vice-president in charge of consumer loans in one major bank in the State of Washington
stated that his bank soon expected to be financing most consumer acquisition of automobiles by
leases. Telephone conversation with author (October 1977).
286. See generaly Ayer, Clearing the Smog Surrounding Consumer Auto Leasing, 6 PAC. L.J.
447 (1975). See also Truth-in-Lending Annual Report to Congress for the Year 1973 by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, reprinted in INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE (CCH)
Issue No. 271, Part II, 15-16 (Jan. 16, 1974).
287. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (1976).
288. Id. § 1667e.
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act289 provides that no act of Congress
shall preempt any state's regulation of insurance unless the act states
that it is "specifically related to the business of insurance. 290 Proposed
chapter 8 would regulate consumer credit insurance, that is, credit life
and credit accident and health, as well as personal property and liabil-
ity insurance offered or required in connection with a consumer credit
transaction. Provisions should be included, for example, that specify
the terms29' and amounts2 92 of credit insurance. Therefore, to avoid
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, proposed chapter 8 must specifically state
that it is related to insurance.
Suggested chapter 9 should contain sections 161 to 166 of chapter
4 of title I of the existing CCPA.2 93 These sections regulate billing pro-
cedures and the resolution of billing errors. Section 171 of chapter 4 of
title I of the existing CCPA, Relation to State Laws,294 again should be
repealed because the proposed code would totally preempt state con-
sumer credit laws in chapter 1.
Proposed chapter 10 would replace existing title VIII, Debt Collec-
tion Practices.295 Like title VIII, chapter 10 should prohibit harsh col-
lection practices by debt collection agencies. In addition, proposed
chapter 10 should also prohibit harsh collection practices by creditors
collecting their own debts.2 96 The FTC has indicated in its proposed
rule prohibiting unfair credit practices a desire to limit harsh collection
practices by creditors collecting their own obligations. 97 Chapter 10, if
enacted as suggested, would avoid the need for the proposed rule.
Chapter 11 would contain all limitations on the creditor's attempts
to enforce a credit obligation with the exception of the limitations on
harsh debt collection practices found in chapter 10. For example,
chapter 11 should specify under what circumstances the creditor may
289. Id. §§ 1011-1015.
290. Id. § 1012. See also Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Ga. 1976) (Merely
because the Truth-in-Lending Act does not specifically exempt insurance does not mean that Act
is "specifically related to the business of insurance.").
291. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 4.202; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 424.207 (West
1974).
292. See, eg., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AT § 4.203; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 424.208 (West
1974).
293. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666e (1976).
294. Id. § 1666j.
295. Id. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. I. 1977).
296. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT §§ 6.101-.303; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.101-
.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
297. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (Proposed § 444.2(a)(10)).
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repossess secured collateral and what procedure must be followed.29 8
Chapter 11 should also contain any limitations on deficiency judg-
ments299 and cosigner liability,3°° as well as the substance of section
169, Prohibition of Offsets, currently in chapter 4 of title I of the ex-
isting CCPA.3° 1
Under the proposed structure, chapter 12 should be drafted to en-
sure effective private enforcement. It should provide a sliding scale of
remedies depending on the nature of the violation.30 2 Minimum penal-
ties should also be provided, as they are in section 130 of title I of the
existing CCPA.30 3 Jurisdiction should lie in both state and federal
courts and consumers' attorneys fees should be provided in all success-
ful actions in order to ensure access to the courts similar to section 130
of the existing CCPA.3° Class action relief should be available with
some limitation on relief similar to that in section 130 of title I of the
existing CCPA.3 °s Chapter 12 should also contain a statute of limita-
tions that is not applicable to consumer actions raised by way of coun-
terclaim.3°
Chapter 13 would contain provisions relating to administration,
including administrative enforcement. Ideally, chapter 13 would estab-
lish a separate agency for administration. Under the system of admin-
istrative enforcement of title I of the existing CCPA, enforcement
responsibility is divided among a number of agencies30 7 whose primary
298. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT §§ 7.201-.206; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.201-
.207 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
299. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT § 7.208; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.209 (West
1974).
300. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT § 7.111; Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on
Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (Proposed § 444.2(b)(4)).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (1976).
302. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT §§ 8.105-.110; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.302-
.305 (West 1974).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
304. Id. § 1640(e).
305. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
306. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 8.103; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.307 (West
1974).
307. The CCPA is enforced by the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national
banks, 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976), the Federal Reserve Board with respect to member banks of the
Federal Reserve System, id., the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
with respect to banks insured by the F.D.I.C., id., the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect to
carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act, id., the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any
activities covered by the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, id., the Farm Credit Administration
with respect to any bank or association under its administrative control, id., the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board with respect to any bank or association under its control, Id., the Administrator
of the National Credit Union Administration with respect to any federal credit union, Id., and the
Federal Trade Commission generally, id.
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duties are not related to consumer protection. 08 As a result, enforce-
ment of consumer protection provisions is often of secondary con-
cern. 30 9  Even if the proposed code, like existing title I, divided
administrative enforcement among existing agencies, such enforcement
could be improved by better staffing of those agencies. This is not an
outlandish proposal, even given a "Proposition 13" mentality, because
most of the funding for administration of a federal code could come
from those creditors regulated by the code.310
Moreover, there would be better administrative enforcement if a
federal code were designed to incorporate the enforcement potential of
state agencies now charged with enforcing state consumer credit laws.
This approach would lessen the fears of state employees whose jobs
would be threatened by a federal code that totally preempts state con-
sumer credit regulation. The incentive to the states to adequately en-
force a federal law could be monetary grants based on the quality of
enforcement. Similar systems of state enforcement of federal law cur-
rently exist under the Clean Air Act31' and the Federal Water Control
Act.312
Proposed title II, Extortionate Extensions of Credit; title III, Re-
strictions on Garnishment; title IV, Consumer Credit Reporting; title
V, Equal Credit Opportunity; and title VI, Electronic Funds Transfers
are found in the existing CCPA as titles II,313 III,3 14 VI,315 VII316 and
IX 317 respectively. Proposed title II is not included within title I of the
proposal because title II is primarily a criminal statute.3" 8 Titles III,
IV, and VI of the proposal are excluded from title I because they cover
308. The one possible exception is the FTC. In addition to traditional consumer protection
activities, however, the Commission must devote substantial time and effort to prohibiting "unfair
methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45b (1976).
309. "In addition, this committee and other congressional and government sources have found
the level of administrative enforcement by the Federal bank agencies seriously inadequate." S.
REP. No. 95-720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
310. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 9.203; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 426.202 (West
1974 & Supp. 1978).
311. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. 1978). See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.19
(1977).
312. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). See W. RODGERS, supra note 311, §§ 3.19, 4.21 (1977).
313. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1976).
314. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677.
315. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681t (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
316. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(1976).
317. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (West Supp. 1979).
318. Title II of the CCPA, Extortionate Credit Transactions, is a criminal statute codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976). The purpose of the statute is to combat organized crime.
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noncredit as well as credit transactions.319  Title VII is excluded be-
cause it covers nonconsumer credit transactions. 320 Because this article
has not discussed criminal sanctions or transactions other than those
involving the extension of credit to consumers, no suggestions are of-
fered for the structure or substance of titles II-VI of the proposal.32'
IV. EXPECTED CRITICISMS
A proposed comprehensive federal consumer credit code would be
hotly contested. In this part, the major 322 objections to regulating con-
sumer credit entirely by federal law will be discussed with some rebut-
tal.
A. Experimentation in Consumer Credit Legislation
One of the major objections to comprehensive federal consumer
credit legislation has traditionally been that such legislation will stifle
innovation by precluding the states from adopting experimental solu-
tions to consumer credit problems as they arise.3 2 3 It is true that some
319. The definition of consumer credit is the lending of money or the sale of goods and serv-
ices to a natural person for a personal, family or household purpose by a creditor who regularly
makes such loans or sales when a finance charge is levied or the creditor agrees to allow repay-
ment in more than four installments. See note I and accompanying text supra.
Title III of the CCPA, Restriction on Garnishment, is a limitation on all types of garnish-
ment, and not just garnishment resulting from credit transactions, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1976). Title
VI of the CCPA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, deals not only with credit worthiness but suitabil-
ity for employment and insurability. Id. § 1681 (1976). The newly added title IX, Electronic
Funds Transfers, does not deal at all with consumer credit. Section 903(2) of title IX, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1693a(2) (West Supp. 1979), defines that title's scope as including "other than. . . an open end
credit plan." The title is meant to cover electronic funds transfers only from savings and checking
accounts, and not extensions of credit.
320. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, title VII of the CCPA, is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f(1976). Title VII applies to allextensions of credit, and not just to consumer credit.
Id. § 1691.
321. The problems discussed above about nonuniformity of state laws, however, would appear
to apply equally here to all but title II, Extortionate Extensions of Credit. The benefits of a com-
prehensive federal law are as applicable to these titles as to the extension of credit to consumers.
To the extent that these other current titles of the CCPA allow for inconsistent state laws, see, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976), the current titles should be redrafted to allow total federal preemption.
322. It is assumed that there would be no major objection to the constitutionality of a federal
consumer credit law. It is clear that Congress has the power to regulate consumer credit to the
exclusion of the states and does so in the Consumer Credit Protection Act based on the commerce
clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, and the bankruptcy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. See, e.g.,
Mourning v. Family Publication Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports,
Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), aj'd, 402
U.S. 146 (1971); Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Ct., 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
See generally, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970, at 96-102, 177-81, 345-57 (1970).
323. See Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 487, 509-10 (1970).
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experimental state consumer credit legislation has been of benefit.
Most state legislatures, however, have been unwilling to adopt novel
legislative solutions and, in fact, refuse even to adopt the experimental
solutions tried elsewhere and found to be successful. For example,
those states that have adopted legislation regulating deficiency judg-
ment actions have all adopted essentially the same legislation.324 The
Wisconsin Consumer Act 325 was a grand experiment, the first compre-
hensive consumer credit code to be negotiated by creditor and con-
sumer groups. Although it became effective in 1973,326 its most
innovative and beneficial feature-an efficient, inexpensive judicial
proceeding required before the repossession of collateral in consumer
credit transactions327 -has yet to be adopted by any other state.328
In addition, solutions to developing consumer credit problems can
come from sources other than state statutes. On January 3rd of each
year, the United States Attorney General and the Federal Reserve
Board must report to Congress concerning their respective administra-
tion of existing title I of the CCPA and make such recommendations as
they deem necessary or appropriate.329 The recommendations offered
for amendments to cure the deficiencies of existing title I have been
well received by Congress. 330 Likewise, a comprehensive federal code
could provide for recommendations by the agency charged with admin-
istration. Also, some flexibility in dealing with newly devised, harsh
creditor practices could be provided the administrator of the proposed
code by enabling the administrator to prohibit unconscionable prac-
tices on a case-by-case basis.33'
324. See Appendix infra. Whether or not a deficiency is allowed generally depends on the
cash price of the goods or amount owing at the time of default. Little has been done to regulate
the sale procedure in order to ensure that the sale price will equal or approximate the fair market
value of the goods sold.
325. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-428.106 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
326. Ch. 239, § 39(1), 1971 Wis. Laws 688.
327. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.111 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
328. See Appendix infra.
329. 15 U.S.C. § 1613 (1976).
330. For example, the Federal Reserve Board recommended on January 16, 1973, that Con-
gress amend § 125 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976), in order to limit the time
in which the consumer's right to rescind would run when the creditor failed to notify the consumer
of the right of rescission. See Truth-in-Lending Annual Report to Congress for the Year 1972 by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, reprintedin INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE
(CCH) Issue No. 216, Part II, at 15-16 (1973). On October 28, 1974, subsection f was added to
§ 125, which limits the right of rescission to three years after the date of consummation of the
transaction or the sale of property, whichever is earlier, whether or not the creditor notified the
consumer of the right of rescission. See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 404, 405, 412,
88 Stat. 1517 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1976)).
331. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 426.108 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977).
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B. Legislatingfrom Washington, D. C
Another objection that has been voiced in the past to federal con-
sumer credit legislation can be translated freely into "What do they
know in Washington about our problems?" At times those raising the
objection note the geographical and cultural differences between states
and argue that no one law can effectively deal with such differences?3 2
The author has heard creditor representatives voice the objection, how-
ever, more as a fear that the federal government will not adequately
consider the credit industry's concerns in drafting legislation that di-
rectly affects their day-to-day operations. The author has had the same
kind of fear expressed to him by consumer advocates, but then, of
course, the concern is that Congress will not adequately deal with con-
sumer problems.
Although federal consumer credit legislation would be the same
despite cultural and geographical difference-the same for New York
as Wyoming, the same for Washington as Ohio-state consumer credit
legislation also ignores cultural and geographical differences-the same
for Indianapolis as for Bean Blossom, Indiana, the same for Pueblo as
for Aspen, Colorado. Consumer credit granting is a national phenome-
non and not a local one: most consumer credit granting is by large
creditors with interstate organizations, not by local hardware stores.
333
The creditor and consumer objections about the lack of legislative
input at the federal level are also rebuttable. Creditors do have an ade-
quate say in federal consumer credit legislation. The Truth in Lending
Act was considered for seven years before passage, 334 during which nu-
merous hearings were conducted at which creditor representatives were
most often the witnesses.335 Many of the major Washington, D.C. lob-
bies represent credit grantors,336 and those lobbies take a very direct
and active interest in federal consumer credit legislation.
If the creditor concern, though, is really that creditors have a better
chance to get what they want at the state level than at the federal level,
332. See D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 31, § 19.06 at 809. See generally Felsen-
feld, supra note 323.
333. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 2. See also, H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Tables I & 2) reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962.
334. Id. at 1999 (remarks of Leonore K. Sullivan). The first bill was introduced in 1960 by
Senator Paul Douglas (D. Ill.), but it was not acted upon until 1967.
335. See Truth in Lending Bill" Hearings on . 1740 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Truth in Lending.- Hearings on S. 1750
Before a Subcomn of/the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
336. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, THE WASHINGTON LOBBY 43-45 (2d ed. 1974).
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that is probably true. 37 There is a better balancing of concerns at the
federal level, but that emphasizes the need for federal legislation. The
better balancing of interests at the federal level should also calm those
consumer advocates concerned with more extensive federal regulation.
In most states there is no organized consumer lobby. To the extent
there is, it may consist of unpaid volunteers or perhaps a legal services'
lawyer with many other concerns. And in most states there is very little
legislative staff with consumer credit expertise. It is hard for a state
legislator to oppose legislation proposed by a creditor advocate or
adopt legislation opposed by a creditor advocate if the only view on the
merits of the legislation by one with consumer credit expertise is that of
the creditor advocate. At least at the federal level there are some orga-
nized consumer lobbies3 8 and legislative staff with consumer credit ex-
pertise. This is not to say all federal legislation is perfectly balanced
between creditor and consumer concerns, but there is at least the
chance for a balance that is nonexistent in most states.
V. CONCLUSION
The author recognizes that enactment of a comprehensive federal
consumer credit code would not be an easy political feat. Concerns
about state interests, the inherent fears of vested interests about new
legislation and its potential effects, the difficulties of balancing con-
sumer and creditor interests in order to gain acceptance, and Congress'
concern about the time needed for such legislation, plus its members'
fears of political reprisals if things go wrong, would combine to create a
lengthy and bruising legislative battle. Technically, the actual drafting
would be difficult. The legislation must deal effectively with problems
recognized at the time of drafting yet ensure flexibility for future
problems. It is hoped, however, that this article establishes that it is
time to begin the drafting and the legislative battle.
337. "[Blusiness groups, rather than consumer groups, are the most powerful lobbies in virtu-
ally every state capital." D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 31, § 16.04 at 468-69.
338. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 336, at 38-45.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF STATE RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES LEGISLATION, OR
COMPREHENSIVE CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION DEALING
WITH INSTALLMENT SALES, IN FOUR SELECTED
CONSUMER PROTECTION AREAS
A. Defnition of Default and Right to Cure
State Definition of Default Right to Cure
Colorado Before creditor may accelerate or proceed
against the collateral after a default consist-
ing of a missed payment, he must send notice
to the debtor advising him he has twenty
days in which to cure the default by tender-
ing all unpaid sums due at the time of tender,
without acceleration, plus any delinquency or
deferral charges. Notice may not be sent un-
til required payment is ten days past due,
Only one cure period per obligation. COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 5-5-111 to -112 (Supp. 1978).
District of On credit sales other than direct motor vehi-
Columbia cle installment loan or loan directly secured
on real estate, after a default consisting of
failure to pay money, the creditor may not
accelerate, sue or proceed against collateral
for thirty days. Debtor may cure default by
tendering unpaid sums due at time of tender,
without acceleration, plus delinquency or
deferral charges, unless creditor has first
given notice of election to accelerate, has
brought action against debtor or has pro-
ceeded against the collateral. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28-3812 (1973).
Iowa Default means the failure Consumer has right to cure unless notice of
to make a required pay- right to cure was given for a prior default
ment within ten days or within last 365 days. Where right exists,
failure to observe any cove- creditor may not accelerate, sue or proceed
nant the breach of which against collateral until twenty days after giv-
materially impairs the col- ing notice that consumer may cure by tender-
lateral or prospect of pay- ing unpaid amounts due at time of tender
ment without justification without acceleration, plus any deferral or de-
under the law. IOWA CODE linquency charges. IOWA CODE ANN.
ANN. § 537.5109 (West § 537.5110 (West Supp. 1978)
Supp. 1978).
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State Definition of Default Right to Cure
Kansas An agreement with respect Creditor may not accelerate or take posses-
to default is enforceable sion of collateral after a default consisting of
only to extent that (1) con- failure to make a required payment until
sumer fails to make a re- twenty days after sending consumer notice of
quired payment or (2) the right to cure by tendering unpaid sums due at
prospect of payment, per- the time of tender, without acceleration, plus
formance or realization on any delinquency or deferral charges. Notice
the collateral is significantly may not be sent until required payment is ten
impaired. KAN. STAT. days past due. Only one cure period is al-
§ 16a-5-109 (1974). lowed per obligation. KAN. STAT. §§ 16a-5-
110 to -111 (1974).
Maine An agreement on default is Creditor may not accelerate, take possession
enforceable only to extent of collateral or otherwise enforce a security
(1) the consumer fails to interest after a default consisting of failure to
make a required payment make a required payment until twenty days
or (2) the prospect of pay- after sending consumer notice of right to cure
ment, performance or reali- by tendering unpaid sums due at time of
zation of collateral is signif- tender, without acceleration, plus delin-
icantly impaired. Signifi- quency or deferral charges. Notice may not
cant impairment is, without be sent until required payment is ten days
limitation: death, insol- past due. Only one cure period is allowed
vency or commencement of per obligation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-
insolvency proceeding; loss, A, § 5.1 10-. 11 (West Supp. 1978).
theft or damage to collat-
eral not covered by insur-
ance; sale or prior encum-
brance of collateral; or ter-
mination of insurance on
collateral. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5.109 (West
Supp. 1978).
Massachusetts An agreement on default is Ten days after a default, the creditor may
enforceable only to extent send a notice to consumer informing him he
that the default is material, may cure within twenty-one days after notice
and consists of failure to by tendering all unpaid sums due at time of
make one or more install- tender, without acceleration, plus deferral or
ments or the occurrence of delinquency charges. Debtor may cure de-
an event that substantially fault by tendering unpaid sums due at time of
impairs the collateral. tender unless creditor has first given notice of
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. election to accelerate, has brought an action
255D, § 21 (Law. Co-op against the debtor or has proceeded against
Supp. 1978). the collateral. Debtor has up to three cure
periods per consumer credit transaction.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 21 (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1978).
Ohio Seller may not accelerate for failure to make
an installment payment that has not contin-
ued for at least thirty days. OHto REV. CODE
ANN. § 1317.06(C) (Page Supp. 1978). See
also part C of this Appendix (right to cure
following repossession).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
State Definition of Default Right to Cure
South Carolina An agreement on default is Creditor may not accelerate, take possession
enforceable only to extent of collateral or otherwise enforce a security
that consumer fails to make interest after a default consisting of a failure
a required payment or the to make a required payment until twenty
prospect of payment, per- days after sending consumer notice of right to
formance or realization of cure by tendering unpaid sums due at time of
collateral is significantly tender, without acceleration, plus any defer-
impaired. S.C. CODE § 37- ral or delinquency charges. Notice may not
5-109 (Supp. 1978). be sent until required payment is ten days
past due. Only one cure period is allowed
per obligation. S.C. CODE §§ 37-5-110 to Ill
(Supp. 1978).
Virginia Creditor may not accelerate or repossess be-
cause of failure to make payment arising
from sale or financing of consumer goods if
payment plus allowable penalty is paid
within ten days of due date. VA. CODE § II-
4.3 (1978) (provision included in title II cov-
ering contracts in general).
West Virginia After a default consisting of failure to make a
scheduled payment for five days or failure to
otherwise perform pursuant to a credit sale,
except with respect to covenants to provide
insurance or otherwise protect collateral, the
creditor may give consumer notice of default
and his right to cure within ten days by
tendering unpaid sums, without acceleration,
plus any delinquency or deferral charges.
The creditor may not accelerate, sue or take
possession of collateral until ten days after
notice. A consumer may cure up to three
times per obligation. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-
106 (1976).
Wisconsin Notwithstanding any agree- A creditor may not accelerate, sue or proceed
ment to the contrary, de- against the collateral, unless he believes the
fault means, without justifi- consumer is in default and more than fifteen
cation under any law, to days have passed since he sent consumer no-
have, in case of monthly tice of default and his right to cure by tender-
payments, two or more ing unpaid installments due at time of tender,
scheduled payments re- without acceleration, plus any deferral or de-
maining unpaid for more linquency charges within fifteen days. A con-
than ten days; to fail to pay sumer may not cure more than twice within a
when due on two occasions twelve-month period. Wis. STAT. ANN,
within any twelve-month § 425.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
period with respect to an
open-end plan; or to fail to
observe any other covenant,
the breach of which materi-
ally impairs the collateral
or the debtor's ability to
pay. WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 425.103 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1978).
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B. Restrictions on Security Interests (Excluding Cross-Collateral Provisions
Involving Multiple Sales)
1. The following states have adopted provisions substantially similar to
the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Essentially, security interests in
credit sales (other than for agricultural purposes) are limited to three catego-
ries: (1) the goods sold; (2) goods upon which services are performed or in
which the goods sold are installed or annexed when the debt secured exceeds
certain amounts; and (3) land to which goods sold are affixed or land which is
maintained, repaired or improved as a result of the sale of goods or services,
and in which the debt secured exceeds certain amounts. The table below lists
the minimum amount of debt that must be secured in order to take a security
interest in "annexed goods," as described in (2), or in land to which goods are
affixed, as described in (3). All states allow security interest in goods sold.
State Minimum Debt Se- Minimum Debt Se-
cured to Obtain Se- cured to Obtain Se-
curity Interest in curity Interest in
Annexed Goods Real Property to
Which Goods Af-
fixed
a. Colorado $ 300 $1,000
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-407(1) (1973).
b. Idaho $ 540 $1,800
IDAHO CODE § 28-32-407 (Supp. 1978).
(Amounts adjusted periodically in accord-
ance with Consumer Price Index. Id. § 28-
31-106.)
c. Indiana $ 450 $ 1,500
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-2-407 (Bums
1974). (Amounts adjusted periodically in
accordance with Consumer Price Index. Id.
§ 24-4.5-1-106.)
d. Iowa $ 300 (household $1,000
IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3301 (West Supp. goods or motor ve-
1978). hicle, $ 100)
e. Kansas $ 300 $1,000
KAN. STAT. § 16a-3-301 (1974).
f. Maine $ 420 $1,400
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 3.301
(West Supp. 1978). (Amounts adjusted peri-
odically in accordance with Consumer Price
Index. Id. 9-A, § 1.106.)
g. North Carolina $ 300 (self-pro- $1,000
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-23 (Cum. Supp. pelled motor vehicle
1977). to which repairs
made, $ 100)
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State Minimum Debt Minimum Debt
Secured to Obtain Secured to Obtain
Security Interest in Security Interest in
Annexed Goods Real Property to
Which Goods
Affixed
h. Oklahoma $ 200 $ 1,000
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-407 (West
1972).
i. South Carolina $ 300 $ 1,000
S.C. CODE § 37-2-407 (Supp. 1978).
j. Utah $ 540 $ 1,800
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-2-407 (Supp.
1977). (Amounts adjusted periodically in
accordance with Consumer Price Index. Id.
§ 70B-1406.)
k. West Virginia $ 300 $ 1,500
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-107 (1976).
1. Wisconsin $ 500 $ 1,000
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.417 (West 1974).
m. Wyoming $ 300 $ 1,000
Wyo. STAT. § 40-14-241 (1977).
2. Arizona-In credit sale, a security interest may only be taken in
goods sold, goods with respect to which services have been rendered and realty
to which goods are affixed, without regard to amount of debt secured. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5501(c) (Supp. 1978).
3. Georgia-No security interest pursuant to a retail installment con-
tract or revolving account may be taken with respect to clothing, softwares and
other nondurable items. GA. CODE ANN. § 96-914 (Supp. 1978).
4. Hawaii-No provision in a retail installment contract may provide
for subsequent inclusion of title to or a lien upon goods other than goods sold,
accessories therefore or auxiliary equipment used in connection therewith.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 476-16 (1976).
5. Massachusetts-No retail installment sale agreement may provide for
a security interest in personal property other than (1) goods sold unless such
goods become affixed to such personal property; (2) after acquired collateral
other than accessions to goods sold or worked on; or (3) goods subject to prior
sale unless two or more agreements are consolidated. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
255D, § 15 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1977).
6. New York-No retail installment contract may provide for a security
interest in any real or personal property other than goods sold, except a mort-
gage on real property may be taken to secure payment for goods and services
for repairs or improvements in connection with buildings on the real property.
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 421 (Consol. 1976).
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7. Ohio-Seller may only take security interest in goods sold, goods
upon which services are performed or goods to which goods sold are annexed.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.071 (Page Supp. 1978).
8. Texas-No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall
grant a first lien upon real estate except (a) such lien as is created by law upon
the recording of an abstract of judgment or (b) contracts for sale or construc-
tion of a residence so long as the time price differential does not exceed 10%.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
C Restrictions on Refpossession
1. Colorado-A seller who repossesses because he deems himself inse-
cure or because he feels his collateral is impaired, but is later unable to show,
in good faith, that he had reasonable cause to believe such was the case, shall
be liable to buyer for court costs and attorneys' fees and will not be able to
exact finance charges for period in which debtor is without use of collateral.
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 5-5-103.5 (Supp. 1978). Prior to judgment seller may not
replevy goods of the debtor, except motor vehicles, with the use of force from a
dwelling upon an ex parte order of the court. Id. § 5-5-104 (1973).
2. Connecticut-Under the Retail Instalment Sales Financing Act,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-83 to -100a (West 1958 & Supp. 1978), a seller
has two options. He may send notice at least ten days prior to a retaking,
stating the nature of the default, the buyer's rights and the date of the intended
retaking. If the buyer does not cure the default within the specified period, the
seller may retake, and the buyer loses the right to redeem. Alternatively, if the
seller does not give this notice, after retaking he must hold the goods fifteen
days, during which time the buyer may redeem by paying the unaccelerated
amount due at time of retaking, or tendering other performance, plus paying
the actual and reasonable costs of retaking and storing. Id. § 42-98 (West
Supp. 1978).
3. District of Columbia-The Consumer Protections Act, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 28-3801 to -3817 (1973 & Supp. V. 1978), provides that the parties
may agree that the creditor may repossess without judicial process, but only if
it can be done without breach of the peace and with consent of the debtor. Id.
§ 28-3812 (1973). Additional provisions are contained in the Consumer Retail
Credit Regulations. See 2 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 6655-6657.
4. Hawaii-Under Hawaii's Retail Installment Sales Act, HAw. REv.
STAT. §§ 476-1 to -38 (1976), a seller has the option of sending the buyer notice
20-40 days prior to repossession stating the nature of default, the intention to
retake and the buyer's rights upon retaking. If the buyer does not cure the
default before the day set for retaking, the seller may retake and the buyer
forfeits his right to redeem. If this notice is not sent, the seller must hold the
goods for ten days, during which time the buyer may redeem upon payment of
amount owing on the contract, plus costs of retaking when allowed. Id. § 476-
24, -25.
5. Maryland-Under the Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -636 (1975 & Supp. 1978), the seller may send buyer
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a discretionary notice at least ten days before repossession stating the default,
date of repossession and the buyer's rights upon retaking. Id. § 12-624(c)
(Supp. 1978). If the seller repossesses, he must hold goods for fifteen days
after sending a required notice informing buyer of right to redeem by tender-
ing the amount due at the time of redemption, without acceleration, or by
tendering other required performance. The seller may also collect actual and
reasonable expenses of retaking and storing if the above discretionary notice
was sent. Id. § 12-625 (1975).
6. Massachusetts-Under Retail Installment Sales and Services Act,
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 255D, §§ 1-32 (Law. Co-op 1968 & Supp. 1978), a se-
cured creditor may use self-help repossession only if it can be done without
use of force, without breach of peace and with the consent of the debtor to
enter his property given at time of such entry. Id. ch. 255D, § 22(a) (Supp.
1978).
7. Ohio-Under the Retail Installment Sales Act, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1317.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1978), a secured party may not repossess col-
lateral, except for motor vehicles and motor homes, if time balance at time of
default is less than 25% of the original time balance plus amount of down
payment. Id. § 1317.13 (Supp. 1978). The buyer has a right to cure his default
within twenty days after repossession or fifteen days after notice of right to
cure is sent, whichever is later, by tendering installments due or past due at the
time of tender, any unpaid delinquency or deferral charges, actual and reason-
able costs of retaking, and bond or cash in the amount of two installments to
secure timely payment of future installments. Id. § 1317.12.
8. Wisconsin-In order to enforce his security interest, a creditor must
file a replevin action in small claims court, regardless of the value of the collat-
eral. The abbreviated proceeding considers the sole issue of right to possession
of the collateral. Filing costs are minimal and action may be commenced
without the services of an attorney. The summons must give clear notice of
right to a hearing on the merits. Following a default judgment or successful
hearing on the merits, the creditor may repossess. If self-help repossession is
utilized, the merchant may not breach the peace or enter the debtor's dwelling
except with the latter's voluntary request. For fifteen days after issuance of
summons, the customer may redeem the goods by tendering unpaid amounts,
without acceleration, plus delinquency or deferral charges and any court costs
or fees. The debtor must also make a performance deposit of three scheduled
installments. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.203-.208 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
D. Restrictions on Dficiency Judgments
1. The following states have enacted provisions dealing with deficiency
judgments that substantially conform to the recommendation of the National
Commission on Consumer Finance and the 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit
Code. That is, the seller must sometimes elect his remedies. If he accepts
voluntary surrender or repossesses goods in such cases, the consumer will not
be personally liable for a deficiency. If the seller chooses to sue on the debt in
a situation where the buyer would not be liable for a deficiency judgment had
the goods been repossessed, then he may not levy on the collateral in satisfac-
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tion of any judgment obtained. The following table indicates the states and
the amount below which the election of remedies is required.
State Seller Must Elect Remedies If:
a. Colorado Cash sales price is $1,000 or less.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-5-103 (Supp. 1978).
b. District of Columbia Cash sales price is $2,000 or less.
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 28-3812 (1973).
c. Idaho Cash sales price is $1,800 or less.
IDAHO CODE § 28-35-103 (Supp. 1978).
(Amount adjusted periodically in accord-
ance with Consumer Price Index. Id. § 28-
31-106.)
d. Indiana Cash sales price is $1,500 or less.
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-103 (Burns
1974). (Amount adjusted periodically in
accordance with Consumer Price Index.
Id. § 24-4.5-1-106.)
e. Kansas Cash sales price is $1,000 or less.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-5-103 (1974).
f. Maine Amount financed is $1,400 or less.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 5.103
(Law. Co-op Supp. 1978). (Amount ad-
justed periodically in accordance with the
Consumer Price Index. Id. tit. 9A,
§ 1.106.)
g. Minnesota Aggregate amount of credit extended is $3,000
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.947 (West Supp. or less.
1978).
h. Oklahoma Cash price is $1,000 or less.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 5-103 (West
1972).
i. Oregon Unpaid time balance or time sales price is less
OR. REv. STAT. § 83.830 (1977). than $1,250.
j. South Carolina Cash sales price is $1,500 or less.
S.C. CODE § 37-5-103 (Supp. 1977).
k. Utah Cash sales price is $1,600 or less.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-5-103 (Supp.
1977). (Amount adjusted periodically in
accordance with the Consumer Price In-
dex. Id. § 70B-1-106.)
1. West Virginia Balance owed at time of repossession is $1,000
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-119 (1976). or less.
m. Wisconsin Amount owing on default is $1,000 or less.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.209 (West 1974).
n. Wyoming Cash price is $1,000 or less.
Wyo. STAT. § 40-14-503 (1977).
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2. Alabama-If seller or assignee of seller repossesses or voluntarily ac-
cepts surrender of goods with an original cash price of $1,000 or less, the buyer
is not personally liable for the deficiency. ALA. CODE § 5-19-13 (1975).
3. Arizona-If seller elects to bring action for the unpaid balance he
may not thereafter retake or levy on the goods. If seller, however, elects to
repossess, buyer is not liable for a deficiency if the sales price is less than
$1,000. Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5501(B), (C) (Supp. 1978).
4. California-The Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 1801-1801.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979), which does not cover sales of reg-
istered motor vehicles, provides that if proceeds of sale of repossessed goods
are not sufficient, the holder may not recover the deficiency from the buyer or
anyone who has succeeded to the buyer's obligations. Id. § 1812.5 (1973).
5. Connecticut-The holder may not recover a deficiency from a retail
buyer, except in the case of a motor vehicle with an aggregate cash price of
more than $2,000. In such case the amount of deficiency is determined by a
statutory formula. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-98(f), -98(g) (West Supp.
1979). -
6. Florida-If a creditor repossesses, the consumer shall not be person-
ally liable to the creditor for a deficiency unless the unpaid balance at the time
of default was $2,000 or more. When unpaid balance is $2,000 or more, the
amount of deficiency will be determined by using fair market value. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 516.31(3) (West Supp. 1979).
7. Georgia--Seller is not entitled to recover a deficiency against the
buyer unless within ten days after repossession he gives buyer notice of intent
to pursue a deficiency claim. GA. CODE ANN. § 96-909 (1976).
8. Hawaii-If buyer has paid 80% or more of the total time-sale price at
the time of default and surrenders the goods without legal proceedings, the
holder must within five days after repossession elect to (1) retain the goods and
release the buyer from further obligation or (2) return the goods and sue to
recover balance due. HAW. REv. STAT. § 476-28 (1976).
9. Illinois-If buyer has paid 60% or more of the deferral payment price
at the time of his default and surrenders the goods without legal proceedings,
the holder must within five days after repossession elect to (1) retain the goods
and release the buyer from further obligation or (2) return the goods and sue
to recover balance due. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 526 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979).
10. Massachusetts-If the unpaid balance of a consumer credit transac-
tion at the time of default was less than $1,000, the buyer is not liable for any
deficiency. If the unpaid balance is $1,000 or more, any deficiency is com-
puted by deducting fair market value from the unpaid balance. MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 255D(d), 255D(e), § 22 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
11. Ohio-After repossession, a secured party must dispose of collateral
by public sale. Ten days prior to sale he must send notice to debtor stating,
inter alia, that debtor may be liable for any deficiency. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1317.16 (Page Supp. 1978).
12. Washington-The Washington version of UCC § 9-501 provides
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that when a seller takes or retains consumer goods subject to a purchase
money security interest to secure all or part of its price, the debtor shall not be
liable for any deficiency. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-501 (1966).

